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The Labour Relations Act1 marked a major change in South Africa’s statutory 
industrial relations system.2 Through the transition to political democracy the LRA 
has encapsulated the government’s plan to democratise society and the labour 
relations system as a whole.3 The LRA’s purpose is to change the law governing 
labour relations and consequently give effect to the rights enumerated in section 23 of 
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa.4 Unfortunately the increase in 
casualisation and externalisation of employment has led to labour-broker workers and 
other non-standard employees being denied their constitutionally protected rights. 
Labour-broker workers fall under the tag of ‘non-standard forms of work,’ and as a 
result they often find themselves outside the ambit of the protections provided for by 
the Constitution and the LRA.5 This patent defect in the legislation has led to the 
abuse of these workers that has consequently left us at a juncture where the 
amendments became an urgently required change. 
 
The paper will focus primarily on Labour Law with a particular emphasis being 
placed on the amendments to the LRA that deal with labour-broker employees. In 
order to fulfil this endeavour, the perceived purpose of labour law will be looked at to 
inform a discussion of what the amendments should be aiming to achieve. Further 
reference will also be made to fundamental International Labour conventions in order 
to enlighten the analysis.  
 
                                                
1 66 of 1995 (Hereinafter the LRA)   
2 Du Toit D, Godfrey S, Cooper C, Giles G, Cohen T, Conradie B and Steenkamp A (2015) Labour 
Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide LexisNexis page 6.  
3 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 6.  
4 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 hereafter (the Constitution). 
5 66 of 1995	
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The pertinent research question can therefore be expressed as follows; to what extent 
will the 2014 amendments to the LRA alleviate the challenges associated with 
vulnerable labour broker workers.  
 
The Phenomenon of Non-standard employment  
 
To begin the discussion this paper will seek to unpack the phenomenon of non-
standard work. This is integral in order to better understand the context and 
challenges faced by vulnerable workers who are entangled in complex labour broking 
relationships. Non-standard employment can be categorised in two broad processes, 
namely casualization and externalisation.6 The former is considered as a doctored 
version of traditional employment, while the latter involves workers providing goods 
and services to the client in terms of a commercial contract, often, but not always, 
involving a satellite enterprise or intermediary.7 Labour broker workers are often 
employed and their services utilised through the use of the controversially infamous 
tripartite commercial contract. The growth of non-standard employment has been 
spurred by the need to have greater temporal and numerical flexibility to cope with 
varying demands brought about by global market uncertainty, and further to reduce 
human resource management responsibilities and costs.8 These costs generally pertain 
to the risks and difficulties associated with termination of employment.9 This shift 
towards non-standard employment allows the employer to change the status of the 
individual employee by restructuring the employment relationship with the help of the 
commercial contractual arrangement.10 As a result of the cloaked design of the 
commercial contract, the employer is then able to avoid labour laws and the labour 
broker employee is deprived of his/her labour rights.11  
 
                                                
6 Le Roux R “The World of Work: Forms of engagement in South Africa” (2009) Institute of 
Development and Labour Law 1 at 13.  
7 Le Roux (2009) Institute of Development and Labour Law at 13 
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid.  
10 Le Roux (2009) Institute of Development and Labour Law at 27.  
11 Theron J “Prisoners of a Paradigm: Labour broking, the new services and non-standard employment” 
(2012) Acta Juridica 58 at 62. 
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The increase in non-standard forms of employment is an international phenomenon 
that has been fuelled by globalisation.12 The rapid expansion and contraction of 
industries and the need to modify their product to match changing demands has 
significantly influenced the move towards non-standard forms of employment.13 The 
use of labour brokers now forms a large part of the changing nature of work which 
comprises of a shift away from full-time employment for an indefinite period while 
being under the control of an employer at such employer’s premises.14 These changes 
have posed numerous problems for the regulation of labour in South Africa. This is 
especially with regard to the provision of employment security and the realisation of 
rights to fair labour practices.  
 
The drive towards non-standard employment and externalisation is used by employers 
to transform and delegate work formerly done by permanent employees, to temporary 
workers who are engaged in a tripartite relationship between the worker, the client 
and the labour broker.15 The relationship is dictated by a commercial contract, and 
while the client benefits from having utilised the workers, that client is still able to 
avoid accountability from labour legislation on the basis that the client is not the 
actual employer as provided for in the LRA.  
 
Consequently this practice has become a contentious form of employment and trade 
unions have gone as far as to call for a ban on labour broking and its operations.16 The 
continued expansion of the labour broking arena has resulted in a disjuncture between 
the law regulating temporary employment, and the reality that these relationships 
create.17 Thus far, the law has failed to adequately cater for the needs of the 
vulnerable workers in this new employment structure. The amendments have thus 
come about at a crucial juncture.  
 
 
                                                
12 Tshoose C and Tsweledi B “A Critique of the protection afforded to Non-standard workers in a 
temporary employment services context in South Africa” (2014) 18 Law Democracy and Development 
334 at 334. 
13 Tshoose and Tsweledi (2014) Law democracy and Development 335. 	
14 Tshoose and Tsweledi (2014) Law democracy and Development 335. 
15 Gericke E “Temporary Employment Services: Closing a loophole in section 198 of the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995” (2010) 31 Obiter 92 at 94. 
16 Theron (2012) Acta Juridica 58.  
17 Ibid.  
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Challenges faced by the Labour broking Industry 
 
The labour broking industry has evidently been a highly contentious area of the South 
African labour market. As a result, the Congress of South African Trade Unions has 
led the calls for a ban on the labour broking industry.18 Unions allege that the abuse 
labour broker workers have to endure at the instance of the commercial contract can 
be likened to slavery as they are forced to contract without the protection of their full 
spectrum of labour rights.19 Despite the consistent calls for a ban on the industry, the 
government has preferably gone for the route of greater policing and regulation.  
 
It should be noted that research indicates that the shift from formal employment to 
non-standard forms of employment is on the increase. 20 The majority of workers who 
leave the formal employment sector often re-enter the employment sector through one 
of the non-standard forms of employment.21 This has led to instability within the 
labour market and consequently this impacts negatively on employment growth and 
on the reduction of unemployment and poverty. The compounding issues result in 
greater economic and social insecurity.22 
 
The problems have been perpetuated through a number of key assumptions 
underpinning labour regulation that over time have been proved to not always 
represent the labour broking and non-standard relationship. The first of these 
assumptions is that the workplace is where the workers actually work and that their 
employer controls the workplace.23 Workers’ rights, such as the right to join a trade 
union are compromised, while at the same time trade unions rights to bargain and 
negotiate on behalf of the workers are diminished. As legislation is based on this 
eroded concept of the where the workplace is, non-standard workers are effectively 
excluded from enjoying the rights provided for by the LRA.  
 
                                                
18 S Harvey “Labour Brokers and Workers’ Rights: Can they co-exist in South Africa” (2011) 128 
SALJ 100 at 100.  
19 Harvey (2011) SALJ 100.  
20 Dicks R “ The Growing informalisation of work: Challenges for labour – recent developments to 
improve the rights of atypical works” (2007) Law Democracy and Development 39 at 39. 
21 Dicks (2007) Law Development and Democracy 39. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Theron J “The shift to services and triangular employment” (2008) Industrial Law Journal 58 at 61.	 
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The second key assumption revolves around the notion that employment is a binary 
relationship between the employer and the employee.24 It has always been assumed 
that there is a clear distinction between employment and self-service, and that those 
employees in self-service are able to fend for themselves.25 This distinction has been 
pronounced in the legal distinction between employees and independent contractors. 
However in the new triangular employment structures that characterise non-standard 
employment, the interests of the client are paramount.26 This problem cannot be 
alleviated through collective bargaining because as briefly set out above the 
formulation of the triangular relationship means that non-standard employees are 
more than often excluded from joining trade unions.  
 
The tripartite commercial contract therefore becomes the instrument of abuse upon 
which the labour broker and the client can do as they please with the workers. The 
formulation of section 198 further allows for the abuse and ensures that when a 
worker is unfairly dismissed at the instance of the client, such worker is often absent 
any means to legal recourse.27 When the worker does attempt to take action, the client 
often points to section 198 that deems the labour broker and not the client to be the 
employer. In turn the labour broker points out that the dismissal took place at the 
instance the client and further that client has a contractual right to end the contract and 
therefore the broker cannot be held accountable. All in all the result is that no 
actionable dismissal will have taken place. Resultantly, the worker is left unemployed 
and with an industry ready to repeatedly take advantage of this legislative loophole.  
 
The third assumption relates to employment relationship as always being indefinite.28 
The labour broker worker is almost always utilised for short-term posts, in order to 
satisfy short-term needs or allow for flexibility. Resultantly their relationships are also 
characterised by a lack of employment security. Employment security is an integral 
part of employment rights, and without it none of the other rights can be realised.29  
                                                
24 Theron (2008) Industrial Law Journal at 61.  
25 Theron (2008) Industrial Law Journal at 62.   
26 Theron (2008) Industrial Law Journal at 62  
27 Botes A “Answers to the questions? A Critical analysis of the Amendments to the Labour Relations 
Act 66 of 1995 with regard to Labour Brokers” (2014) 26 South African Mercantile Law Journal 110 
at 112. 




 Lastly, is the incorrect assumption with regards to the centrality of industry based 
bargaining in the South African labour system.30 Part of this mistaken belief was that 
different industries in the economy could be demarcated according to the nature of the 
business conducted at the workplace taken as a whole and without state intervention.31 
However, despite this incorrect assumption, engaging in collective bargaining has 
constantly been a difficult if not almost impossible endeavour for labour broker 
workers. The workers, being detached from the workplace of the client and 
continuously on the move, often find it difficult to join trade unions and have access 
to the accompanying collective bargaining power.32 The contemporary workplace 
relating to non-standard employment has been structured in a way that ensures that 
the client is the dominant economic entity, who determines the parameters on which 
employment is provided and also controls the actual workplace.33  
 
 
Outline of the 2014 Amendments to the LRA with a specific emphasis on section 
198A 
 
The amendments aim to respond to increased informalisation and to ensure that 
vulnerable non-standard employees receive sufficient protection and decent 
conditions of work.34 In doing so, the amendments endeavour to ensure that the 
amended sections give effect to fundamental Constitutional rights that include fair 
labour practices, the right to equality and protection from unfair discrimination, and 
also the right to bargain collectively. The central question of the research is to analyse 
and determine the competence of the amendments in attempting to alleviate the 
problems associated with the contemporary workplace and labour broker workers.  
 
                                                
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid.  
32 Theron (2008) Industrial Law Journal 62. 
33 Theron (2008) Industrial Law Journal 67.  
34 Labour Relations Amendment Bill of 2012 at 24.  
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Section 198A, is the main thrust behind the drive to afford greater protection for 
labour broker workers. The section endeavours to extend protection to employees 
earning under the earnings threshold as provided for in section 6(3) of the BCEA.35  
 
The criterion to determine what constitutes a temporary service is set out in section 
198A(1).36 In the cases where it is determined that the employee is rendering a 
temporary service, the temporary employment service remains as the employer of the 
worker. However under section 198A(3)(b), if the employee’s work falls outside the 
influence of the definition of temporary services, then that employee will be deemed 
to be the employee of the client. Subsection 198A(4) is added to prevent the employer 
from circumventing section 198A(3)(b), and any attempt at avoiding its operation will 
be considered as a dismissal.37  
 
Where a labour broker employee is deemed to be the employee of a client in terms of 
section 198A(3)(b) further benefits are extended in that the employee must be 
employed on terms not less favourable than those of the clients permanent 
employees.38 However, grounds to justify differentiation are provided for in section 
198D. Section 198A and its revised provisions attempt to come together to mitigate 




Supplementing the above-mentioned sections, is section 21 and 22 of the 
amendments.  They are integral as they cater for trade unions, and aim to eradicate the 
problems faced with regards to non-standard workers exercising their collective 
bargaining rights. This endeavour is undertaken in a number of ways. When 
determining representativeness, a Commissioner is now allowed to consider the 
composition of the workplace, taking into account the extent to which there are non-
standard workers in the employ of the client.39 More importantly, trade unions are 
now allowed to exercise organisational rights for labour broker employees either at 
                                                
35 Tshoose and Tsweledi (2014) Law democracy and Development 341.		
36 Tshoose and Tsweledi (2014) Law democracy and Development 341 
37 Botes (2014) South African Mercantile Law Journal 130. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Botes (2014) South African Mercantile Law Journal 115.  
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the workplace of the labour broker or at the workplace of the client.40 Before the 
amendments, the execution of labour broker employees’ collective rights was 
significantly hindered and trade unions found it near impossible to gain access to 
employees who did not perform their services at the office of their employer. Further 
the employees were constantly on the move and would frequently change 
workplaces.41 Trade unions have consequently been unable to reach labour broker 
employees and represent their interests. All in all, section 21 aims to ensure that 
labour broker employees are considered as part of the workforce for the purposes of 
ascertaining trade unions’ representativeness, and resultantly will be able to have 
access to trade unions and the power that comes with being part of the collective unit.  
 
 
Why this Research is necessary 
 
Prior to the amendments, despite various sections of the 1995 LRA existing to 
regulate non-standard work, it is safe to say, and especially in light of the change to 
the traditional employment relationship towards the more complex construction, 
South African labour legislation was on the whole deficient in its regulation of these 
emerging relationships.42 The relevant sections of the LRA dealing with the triangular 
employment relationship simply did not address all the obstacles faced by 
employees.43 The LRA only provided umbrella provisions and as time passed it 
became clear that there was more to the triangular relationship that needed to be 
catered for by effecting statutory changes to prevent exploitation and infringement of 
labour rights.44  
 
South Africa has a duty to fulfil its international law obligations. This includes 
fundamental International Labour Organisation45 conventions. As was set out in the 
court in National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape 
                                                
40 Ibid.	
41 Botes (2014) South African Mercantile Law Journal 116.  
42 Botes (2014) South African Mercantile Law Journal 112. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45  Hereafter the ‘ILO’.  
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Town and Others, 46  fundamental conventions have been identified by the ILO 
Governing Body and these conventions are said to be integral to the rights of human 
beings at work, irrespective of development of individual member states. Included 
among the fundamental conventions, is the Right to Organize and Collective 
Bargaining Convention.47 As has been mentioned above, a lack of access to collective 
bargaining is just one of the major concerns that have plagued the labour broking 
industry. Further, employment in South Africa also needs to be characterized with 
dignity as well as being underpinned by decent work and fair labour practices.  
 
 There is a general perception within labour law that there is a need to reconceptualise 
and reconfigure the boundaries of labour law. This has come about for a number of 
reasons, chief among them being the change in the world of work and the way in 
which employment is now being undertaken. Unfortunately, labour broker workers 
have drawn the short straw in the labour market and their employment has generally 
punctuated by a lack of employment security among other things. As was stated by 
the Constitutional court, employment security is part and parcel of the right to fair 
labour practices.48 
 
In an effort to plug the holes that represent intolerable derogations from 
fundamentally guaranteed rights, it becomes integral that we research and analyse this 
area of the labour market in order to better evaluate the efficacy of the changes. The 
importance of protecting vulnerable workers and providing for decent work is 
encapsulated  
“on the understanding that work is not only a source of income but more 
importantly a source of personal dignity, family stability, peace in the community and 
economic growth that expands opportunities for productive jobs and employment”49 
 
 
                                                
46 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and Others 2003 
(3) SA 1 (CC) para 34.		
47 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and Others supra 
at para 34. 
48 National Education Health and Allied Workers Union v University of Cape Town and Others 2003 
(3) SA 1 (CC) para 42.  
49 South African Decent Work Country Programme 2010-2014 
















The History and Development of Labour Relations in South Africa 
 
The historical development of South African labour law closely mirrors the socio-
political history of South African Society.50 It is integral to start by understanding the 
history of labour relations in South Africa in order to fully comprehend the current 
period, its problems, and why certain issues are in existence. The way in which the 
labour sector has responded to problems throughout its history, as a result of changes 
in society and its convictions, is also central to understanding why certain problems 
have been addressed in a specific manner or not been addressed at all. Globally the 
problem surrounding labour brokers and their workers has long been in existence, and 
it could be said that South Africa has been relatively sluggish in attempting to remedy 
this area of the law.  
 
 
The First Era of Developments  
 
Labour legislation in South Africa has gone through a number of significant 
modifications over the decades in order to respond to changes in society and the way 
employment is viewed and undertaken.  The first era of comprehensive labour 
                                                
50 Basson AC, Christianson MA, Dekker A, Garbers C, Le Roux PAK, Mischke and Strydom EML  
Essential Labour Law 5ed (2009) 4.   
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legislation consisted of the racially exclusive Industrial Conciliation Act.51  The 
system only catered for white workers and was exclusive of pass bearing African and 
Indian workers. The establishment of industrial councils was used as a spur to 
promote voluntary collective bargaining between employers’ organisations and trade 
unions.52 The emphasis on voluntary collective bargaining is still an enduring legacy 
from the early development of South African labour legislation.53 Unfortunately, 
another enduring legacy is the racially grounded system that laid the basis for a dual 
system of industrial relations.54 The exclusion of African workers served to establish a 
joint monopoly of employers and white workers at the expense of black African 
workers. Subsequently labour market policy largely remained subject to this political 
and ideological vision for over half a century.55  
 
The exclusion of African workers meant that they could be employed on inferior 
terms to their fellow white workers.56 The statutory regulation did not afford African 
workers the same protections as those workers who fell under its purview, and these 
workers were often left open to abuse from employers who did not have to conform to 
basic conditions of employment or collective agreements. The exclusive definition of 
an ‘employee’ with its marginalization of black workers can be likened to the 
problems that faced labour broker employees prior to the 2015 amendments. The fact 
that labour broker employees would fall into a grey area of labour legislation meant 
that have been excluded from their section 23 rights to fair labour practices as well as 
the rights to bargain collectively57 as guaranteed by the Constitution.58  
 
The marginalisation of African workers resulted in a dual system of industrial 
relations. This situation can draw further parallels to the issues that have faced labour-
broker employees prior to the 2014 amendments, where uncertainty ruled the arena 
and the workers were subject to labour rights violations without proper means to 
                                                
51 11 of 1924.  
52 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 8.  
53 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 8 
54 Ibid.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.		
57 Every worker is afforded the right to form and join a trade union, as well as to participate in trade 
union activities. As labour broker employees are not considered to be employees of the client or part of 
the client’s workplace, they cannot be organized by the recognized trade unions at those workplaces, 
and are therefore often unrepresented. 
58 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution).  
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redress. These violations have involved the abuse of the labour broking commercial 
contract in order to deny the workers the full spectrum of their constitutional section 
23 rights. Labour law and the labour broking landscape has been one filled with 
uncertainty and the courts59 have had to weigh in on multiple occasions in order to 
bring about protection for various vulnerable groups of workers. Section 23 of the 
Constitution uses the word worker as opposed to employee. Consequently, and as was 
decided in South African National Defence Union v Minister of Defence and Others,60 
the word worker extends beyond those who enter into a common law contract of 
employment. Protections are thereby afforded to those who may fall foul of the 
traditional employee definition, but instead come under the larger ambit of that of a 
worker. The remedies and protections provided, as well as the specific violations, will 
be fully detailed and analysed later on in the paper. 
 
The segregated system was largely successful and this was also as a result of the 
repressive political dispensation at the time.61 However, growing challenges brought 
about by the segregated industrial relations system coupled with the growth of 
African nationalism and political opposition signalled the start of the end of the 
segregated structure. The industrial system and the apartheid regime started to face 
new challenges from the excluded majority that formed the working class62 and the 
segregated system soon became untenable. In 1977 the government appointed the 
Wiehahn Commission (the Commission) to look into labour legislation and propose 
the necessary reforms necessary to bring labour back under control.63 In 1979 the 
Commission recommended a number of reforms.64  
 
The Commission suggested that African workers be allowed to join registered trade 
unions and be involved and represented on industrial councils and conciliation 
boards. 65   Perhaps the most important reform introduced as a result of the 
                                                
59 NAPE v INTCS Corporate Solutions (2010) 31 ILJ 2120 (LC), Kylie v Commission for Conciliation, 
Mediation and Arbitration and Others 2010 (10) BCLR 1029 (LAC), Discovery Health v Commission 
for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration and Others (2008) 29 ILJ 1480 (LC).    
60 2007 (5) SA 400 (CC). 
61 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 12.  
62 Ibid.	
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.  
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Commission was the establishment of an Industrial Court.66 This court was given a 
wide discretion to measure the conduct of employers and employees against the 
widely defined concept of the unfair labour practice.67 The court rose to the task and 
started to transform South African labour law in innovative ways guided by principles 
of fairness as opposed to the strict application of common law rules.68 Central to this 
innovative approach was the courts recognition that although the employer or trade 
union may have acted lawfully, in that they complied with common law or contractual 
obligations, such conduct could nevertheless be regarded as unfair.69 This innovative 
use of the law can be likened to recent Labour Court judgments where our courts have 
had to come to the aid of unprotected labour broker workers, and other vulnerable 
workers in order to provide a purposive interpretation that mirrors the goals set out in 
the Constitution and labour legislation. 70 This purposive approach has involved 
dissecting the true nature of the relationships outside of the commercial contract and 
offering protections to these vulnerable workers that are in line with the general 
purpose71 of labour law.   
 
The creation of an advisory statutory board was equally integral and its job was to 
continually survey and analyse the labour market and evaluate the effectiveness of 
labour legislation.72 The government accepted most of the proposals in an effort to try 
and bring the militant African worker unions under control. The amendments came 
into action over the course of four years and in this process the legislation changed to 
be called the Labour Relations Act.73 However, although the new unions where now 
allowed to register, a few unions initially declined this option for fear of being co-
opted. 74 In 1981 the ban on mixed unions was finally repealed. New unions were 
                                                
66 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 6. 
67 Ibid.  
68 Ibid.  
69 Basson et al Essential Labour Law 6. 
70  NAPE v INTCS Corporate Solutions (2010) 31 ILJ 2120 (LC), Dyokhwe v De Kock NO and Others 
(2012) 33 ILJ 2401 (LC).   
71 The Traditional dictum as to the purpose of labour law as enunciated by Otto Kahn-Freund is said to 
be to equalise the imbalance of power between the employer and the employee, and to protect the 
weaker party, that party being the employee. These ideas will be expanded upon later in the thesis.  
72 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 12. 
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid.  
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faced with pressure from different sectors and started to register, however, the unions 
continued to reject industrial council participation.75  
 
The rapid growth of the new unions was important in many respects; however, this 
swift growth had both positive and negative effects. It spurred on the push towards 
centralised collective bargaining as the main source of bargaining in South African 
industrial relations. The increased size of the unions allowed them to compete and 
wield considerable power against the established trade unions, employers’ 
organisations and in the council negotiations.76 On the other hand, these changes led 
to a relationship between management and labour that could at best be described as 
troubled and fractitious. In light of this prickly relationship, by the time the new 
Labour Relations Act77 came into action the focus of its changes revolved around 
addressing the prevalent historical tensions as well as providing an improved 
framework for centralised collective bargaining.78 Some argue that this focus was 
slightly misguided.79 At the time the labour market was undergoing fundamental 
changes characterized by a steady increase in casualization and externalisation of 
employment.80 The rapid emergence of non-standard work suggests that this may 
have been the perfect time to tackle issues concerning labour broking, especially 
considering the extensive drafting process of the new Labour Relations Act.81 
However, there seems to have been no discussion on issues central to new forms of 




The Context and Constraints directing the Development of Labour Relations in South 
Africa 
 
                                                
75 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 12. 
76 Du Toit et al Labour Relations Law 13.  
77 66 of 1995.  
78 Godfrey S and Bamu P “The state of centralized bargaining and possible future trends” Le Roux R 
and Rycroft A (2012) Acta Juridica 219-220.  
79 Godfrey and Bamu (2012) Acta Juridica 220.  
80 Ibid.  
81 Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995.		
82 Godfrey and Bamu (2012) Acta Juridica 220.  
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The focus on catering for a stronger collective bargaining was compounded by the 
racial tensions that surrounded the time period around the drafting of the Act.83 The 
Apartheid system of racial segregation that had been enforced in South Africa since 
1948 had officially only just come to an end in 1994. Race relations were tense and 
there was an increased focus on integration and conciliation. Legislation was needed 
to appease the unions and avoid further labour unrest and violence. It was also 
important for labour to be functional in order to aid South Africa’s economic surge 
after years of global exclusion. 
 
The speed at which the government tackled the re-writing of the country’s labour law 
was influenced by a multiplicity factors.84 The promptness can be explained by the 
role of organised labour in the struggle against apartheid and in the ANC’s electoral 
success.85 The Congress of South African Trade Unions86 in particular looked to the 
ANC in order to fulfil its long standing demands with regard to labour dispensation, 
for example on issues relating to centralised bargaining.87 These expectations were 
fortified and consolidated by the ANC’s pre-election commitment, expressed in its 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), to allow for workers to attain 
the fruits of their struggle.88 In light of this urgent revision, it is therefore not 
surprising that the issues surrounding labour brokers were overlooked.  
 
The economic crisis facing South Africa and its new government lent impetus to the 
need for new labour legislation, as well as influencing its content. South Africa was a 
new player on the International stage after years of exclusion. Cohesive and 
undisrupted labour was integral to the planned recovery.  
 
 
The Current Focus and the Difficulties that need to be Addressed   
 
As has been illustrated from the outline of the history of labour relations in South 
Africa, certain periods have been characterised by certain issues and the demand for 
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those problems to be addressed. The difficulties surrounding casualisation of 
employment, and particularly labour broking were not addressed when they first came 
to the fore. Unsurprisingly, the 2014 amendments focus on remedying the situation 
regarding externalisation and casualization of employment. 89  There has been a 
concerted effort to correct the omissions of the original Act regarding non-standard 
workers.90 However, it has been suggested that this focus has been done at the 
expense of addressing the state of centralised collective bargaining, which has 
recently been plagued by weakened trade union organisation as well as growing 
casualization and externalisation of employment.91  It has further been suggested that 
this has had the consequence of ignoring the mechanisms and levers of collective 
bargaining that could be used to assist in the regulation non-standard workers. 
Collective bargaining is an important mechanism by which workers can bargain with 
the employer and address important issues affecting them. The collective force of the 
workers gives them the clout to be able to make the employer accede to their 
demands. Generally, non-standard workers have had very little access to trade unions 
and collective mechanisms; constantly they have suffered considerably with regard to 
having issues being expressed and resolved. This idea and its fixes will be dealt with 





The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution) 
 
 
The new labour dispensation has been punctuated by the advent of the Constitution 
with an entrenched Bill of Rights that has had a profound effect on all areas of the 
law.92 For the purposes of labour law, in the Bill of Rights, section 23 is of 
fundamental importance. The primary rights contained within impact directly on 
labour law, and since the Constitution came into force, the legal system and the courts 
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have had to consider the Constitution’s impact and application.93 Section 39 provides 
that the Constitution is the supreme law of the land and the courts are required, when 
interpreting legislation and the common law, to promote the purport and objects of the 
Bill of Rights. Consequently the Bill of Rights has been interpreted and applied, and 
had a profound impact on the way legislation is understood. The Constitution also 
represents an integral mechanism for private persons to challenge legislation and the 
actions of the state because it sanctions both the horizontal and vertical application of 
rights.94  
 
Although, the Constitution provides for these rights, there is an imperative need for 
our legislation to mirror this protection. This is due in part to the principle of 
subsidiarity as pronounced upon by the courts.95 Section 23 of the Constitution 
expressly provides that legislation may be enacted to regulate labour relations in 
South Africa. The application of the principle of subsidiarity speaks as to whether a 
litigant may bypass the LRA and rely directly on the rights in section 23 of the 
Constitution. In NAPTOSA and Others v Minister of Education, Western Cape, and 
Others,96 the Cape High Court held that a litigant cannot bypass the LRA and directly 
rely on the Constitution without challenging the constitutionality of the LRA that 
provisions for that right. Further, in Minister of Health and Another v New Clicks 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Others,97 it was noted that if the NAPTOSA approach were 
not to be followed, the result might well be the creation of dual systems of 
jurisprudence under the Constitution and under legislation.98 
 
This is important because it dictates that where the legislation is deficient, and does 
not effectively amplify that which is provisioned for in the Constitution, such 
legislation needs to be amended. Such deficiencies in the LRA were exactly the case 
in point with regard to the protection of labour broker workers and other non-standard 
employees. 
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The Effect of The Constitution on Labour Law in South Africa  
 
The LRA and the Basic Conditions of Employment Act99 were propagated as the 
national legislation designed to give effect to the right to fair labour practices referred 
to in section 23 subsection (1). 100  The Employment Equity Act 101  is there to 
supplement both Acts and it deals specifically with discrimination in the workplace 
and employment equity.  
 
Section 23 of the Constitution protects a number of pivotal constitutional rights such 
as “everyone’s” right to fair labour practices, the right to freedom of association (i.e. 
the right to belong to or to participate in a trade union) as well as the right to organise 
and the right to bargain collectively.102 Although the LRA was promulgated to protect 
“everyone’s” labour rights, section 198, has resulted in labour-broker workers being 
denied the right to exercise their labour protections. Section 198 dictates that in the 
event that a person’s services are procured to a client by a temporary employment 
service, the temporary employment service becomes that person’s employer. Through 
various mechanisms and contractual arrangements, these workers are often find 
themselves outside the ambit of the LRA protections relating to fair labour practices 
and the right to procedural and substantively fair dismissals. Essentially, section 198 
has become a vehicle for the abuse of labour broker workers. These mechanisms and 
arrangements that facilitate such abuses will be elaborated upon below.  
 
The Constitution’s applicability to labour law is not only confined to section 23. 
Other sections also play an integral role in supplementing section 23. For example, 
section 9 of the Constitution provides for equality and freedom from 
discrimination. 103  This section provides the framework for any discussions on 
employment equity, discrimination and affirmative action. 104 The interpretive guides 
in section 8 of the Constitution provide that the Bill of Rights applies to all law and 
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binds all areas of government. Further, section 8 states that, when applying any law or 
legislation, the courts must apply the law in a way that gives effect to the Bill of 
Rights, or where necessary, develop that law or legislation in line with the Bill of 
Rights. Section 39 of the Constitution then goes on to say that when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights, a court or tribunal must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society, must consider international law and may consider foreign law. 
These interpretive provisions have often come to the aid of labour broker employees. 
The courts have often relied on a purposive approach that gives effect to the labour 
rights in the Constitution in order to grant vulnerable workers some relief.105  
 
The entrenchment of labour rights in the Constitution has led to the development of 
constitutional jurisprudence by the courts that have had far reaching effects on the 
way the contract of employment and the employment relationships are viewed. 106 
NUMSA and Others v Bader Bop (Pty) Ltd and Another107 is illustrative of the 
omnipotent influence of the Constitution. In NUMSA it was held that where there is 
no clear indication that the legislature intended a statute to limit a right, and if that 
statute is capable of an interpretation in a manner that does not limit fundamental 
rights, then that interpretation should be preferred. The right to fair labour practices is 
a fundamental right.108 There is no clear indication in section 198 that suggests the 
legislature intends to limit the right to fair labour practices. It is therefore submitted 
that an interpretation that protects the right to fair labour practices is always 
preferable, and this would resultantly be in line with the reasoning followed in the 
Discovery Health v CCMA109 case.  
 
Further, it should be noted that section 23(1) provides that ‘everyone has the right to 
fair labour practices.’ The term ‘everyone’, which follows the wording of section 7(1) 
of the Constitution, provides that the Bill of Rights enshrines the right ‘of all people 
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in the country.’ Consequently this is supportive of a broad interpretation of the rights 
protected in section 23.110 As noted in Khosa v Minister of Social Development111 the 
word everyone is a term of general import and unrestricted meaning. It means what it 
conveys.112 It is therefore accepted that the right to fair labour practices vests in 
‘everyone’, despite the validity of their employment contract, 113  and in some 
circumstances, despite their line of work being illegal and against public policy.114 




Labour Broking in South Africa 
 
 
The existence of labour brokers in South Africa has long been a serious issue of 
contention. The debate on their existence ranges from a total ban on the industry, to 
regulation and greater policing by legislation.115 The long running debate over the 
place of labour brokers in the South African labour market took a vital step in 2010 
when the government published drafted proposed amendments to labour 
legislation.116 Zwelinzima Vavi, the General Secretary of COSATU, forecast the 
‘mother of all battles’ over the issue.117 In support of a ban, trade unions submit that 
labour broking is akin to slavery, and that labour broker employees are contracted 
without the full benefit of the protection of the law.  
 
Labour broking relationships are given legal force by the provisions of section 198 of 
the LRA.118 In South Africa, labour brokers are also referred to as temporary 
employment services. The LRA envisages the labour broking relationship to be a 
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tripartite relationship between the labour broker, the employee and the client of the 
labour broker.119 The labour broker procures the services of a worker, for reward, for 
the benefit of the client. Prior to the amendments, in terms of section 198(2), when 
these relationships were brought about, the labour broker, and not the client, was 
always deemed to be the employer. Section 198 provides that, ‘for the purposes of 
this Act, a person whose services have been procured for or provided to a client by a 
temporary employment service is the employee of that temporary employment 
service, and the temporary employment service is that person’s employer.’ 
Consequently the labour broker was always deemed to be the employer, except in 
instances that fell under section 198(4) of the LRA. In these instances, the client and 
the labour broker could be jointly and severally liable if the labour broker contravened 
specific conditions. 
 
For various reasons that will be set out below, section 198 is a highly contentious 
provision. There have been consistent calls by labour activists for a ban on the labour 
broking industry. However, economists have warned that a complete ban would 
impact negatively on the economy.120 In support of this argument, they cite statistics 
showing a growth in employment and they also contend that this means that the 
industry creates jobs.121 Larger broking companies argue that the law before the 
amendments was adequate and that it only needed better enforcement in order to be 
effective. Further the larger broking companies argue that it is only the smaller so 
called ‘bakkie brigade’ that gives a bad name to the industry as a whole.122 Those 
defending labour broking insist the industry is essential to the economy and banning 
them will eliminate an essential function aiding South Africa’s economic growth.123 
 
 
Arguments supporting Labour Broking  
 
The economic argument in favour of labour broking reads as follows. Essentially, it is 
argued that in the era of growing global unemployment, a trend that South Africa has 
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not escaped, the banning of labour brokers would have a disastrous effect.124 The 
labour broking industry does not only cover unskilled workers but covers a whole 
range of professionals that are all regulated under the same legislation.125 Skilled 
labourers are essential to the infrastructure projects being rolled out across the 
country, especially in the electricity, roads, rail, telecommunications, engineering and 
information technology sectors.126 The skilled workers utilised on such projects tend 
to move on when the start-up phase is complete and the project enters into the 
operational or maintenance phase. Businesses cannot be expected to thrive in an 
increasingly competitive market if they are forced to retain these workers on a 
permanent basis.127 
 
Further, it is reasoned that it would be difficult for businesses to provision and hire 
extra staff for peak periods, if those businesses are expected to endure the cost of 
retrenchments at the end of those periods or in a downturn. Financial markets make 
provision for cyclical growth in every industry, and it follows that the organisations 
should be able to staff accordingly.128 In fluctuating economic conditions, labour 
broking services help companies and employers, through flexible employment, to face 
global pressures and deal with changing demand and supply trends.129 The labour 
broking industry is often the faster at creating jobs during periods of economic 
recovery and this plays a vital role in developing basic skills, reducing unemployment 
and providing for the transition to permanent employment.130 As alluded to above, 
labour broker advocates argue that labour legislation prior to the amendments “more 
than adequately addressed the use of labour brokers; what was needed was effective 
enforcement of those laws.”131 
 
The economic argument continues further, stating that, “far from disregarding the 
rights of workers, the TES industry has played, and continues to play, a positive role 
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in the driving of South Africa’s economy”.132 The European Union in collaboration 
with the confederation of trade unions across Europe has legitimised the labour 
broking industry across 28 countries as they recognise their importance in job creation 
and driving the economy.133 The regulatory framework with regard to worker benefits 
over these 28 countries was also strengthened at the same time.134  
 
Supporters of the labour broking movement put forward that the decision to either ban 
or further regulate the labour broking industry is ill advised and would have dire 
consequences for the South African economy. This is according to the Confederation 
of Associations in the Private Employment Sector (CAPES)135 an industry association 
representing the interests of temporary employment services.136 It is forwarded that 
the proposals to change the labour broking system are being based on 
“unrepresentative sector interviews that take anecdotal evidence as the basis upon 
which national labour and employment policy is to be decided.”137 It is alleged that 
there are misconceptions about the labour broking industry in South Africa, and in 
order to substantiate this argument statistics and facts are produced. These statistics 
come from the industry association CAPES and other statutory bodies such as the 
Services and Statistics SA (SETA).  
 
According to these statistics, since 2000, labour brokers have introduced around 3.5 
million temporary, part-time and contract employees into the South African labour 
force.138 Approximately 2 million of these employees were first time job seekers, 92% 
were black and 85% were aged 18 to 35.139 Further, more than 32% of these 
employees secured traditional, permanent jobs within 12 months and 47% did so 
within three years.140 According to the Services (SETA), labour brokers contributed 
R415 million to the National Skills Fund in 2008/2009 alone.141 For the year 2008, 
Statistics SA also show that atypical employees represent between 13.1% and 52.2% 
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of the total sector employment in South Africa with the highest number of these 
atypical workers being found in construction (59.2%), wholesale and retail trade 
(42.8%) and transport and communications (39.7%).142 Although, labour broking 
relationships have been subject to increasing abuse, the facts would suggest that 
labour brokers do in fact play an integral role in the South African economy. This is 
with particular reference to labour brokers being a formal channel for introducing 
unskilled, unemployed workers into the world of work.143 
 
In response to criticisms that the tripartite relationship brought about by labour 
broking gives rise to specific problems and abuses, broking advocates argue that this 
stance is highly selective and does not consider that organisations have a valid basis 
for entering into these agreements which are increasingly common in South Africa 
and around the world.144 For example, by cross-utilising temporary workers between 
multiple organisations and sectors, it is said that agencies provide their work force 
with a degree of continuity in employment that a single employer, subject to various 
internal as well as sectoral cycles could not provide.145 Through the provision of 
recruitment, training, payroll, leave administration and other services, labour broking 
agencies allow companies to focus on their core competencies and outsource time-
consuming non-core functions to specialised third party service providers. There can 
be no doubt that labour broking does in fact have multiple beneficiary functions in the 
labour market especially with regard to provisioning for flexibility and allowing for 
ease of business functionality. However, in my mind, these benefits cannot outweigh 
and allow for a derogation of the right to fair labour practices afforded to all workers. 
The limitation of this particular group of worker’s legal protections, who are usually 
the most vulnerable, cannot be substituted or justified solely on the basis of increased 
labour flexibility.  
 
It is said that the private employment industry represents a R26 billion-revenue 
industry. Statistics suggest that law abiding agencies, and on average, 78.8% of total 
revenue was paid directly to their agency workers in cash and benefits; a further 3.3% 
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was received indirectly by workers in non-cash forms such as classroom and on the 
job training; a further 6.1% was used to offset recruitment, screening, assessment, 
verification and other inherent costs; a further 7.3% was used to offset costs incurred 
in the management and administration of payrolls, benefits, leave, training, 
performance and recognition – and just 3.8% to 4.5% was retained by employment 
agencies as a return on their investments in recruitment tools, countrywide branch and 
office infrastructures, pay- roll and other systems and technology.146 Proponents who 
support the broking movement do not deny that there are some agencies that engage 
in nefarious employment practices, however they suggest that these agencies are the 
small unregulated brokers, and a clear distinction should consequently be drawn 
between the legitimate compliant transparent and audited businesses and the 
disingenuous operators.147 
 
Labour broking agencies evidently perform an essential function in the market. They 
specialize in the recruitment and deployment of dynamic work forces, and these work 
forces allow for flexibility that adapts to the economy’s seasonal, cyclical and other 
market variables. 148  However, the abuses perpetrated by non-compliant brokers 
illustrate the gaps in the system that need to be plugged in order to pull the industry in 
line with constitutional protections afforded to workers. It is submitted that the 
exploitation of workers does not warrant the call for an outright ban on the industry, 
however, contrary to those who argued that regulation was adequate prior to the 
amendments; such abuses illustrate that the need for urgent changes to the regulatory 
framework has not been overstated.  
 
The proponents of the ‘economic’ argument, who believe the regulation prior to the 
amendments was sufficient, fail to see that the legislative position was untenable with 
the Constitution.149 It should be said that although these economic advocates do not 
support the derogation of workers’ rights through the labour broking relationship, 
“Job flexibility should not be achieved through compromising on the rights and 
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working conditions of the workers.”150 Some of their statements do in fact suggest 





The Challenges facing the Labour Broking Industry in South Africa 
 
As shown above, the indignities of the past abuses suffered at the hands of the 
tripartite labour broking relationship have led to many negative reactions towards the 
industry. The protest march in March 2012 organised by COSATU, one of South 
Africa’s leading labour federations, is a prime example of the negative reactions and 
has been illustrative of the growing unease towards the industry in South Africa.151 
 
Globally, labour legislation is put in place with one of its purposes being to protect 
workers. In South Africa, two key protections are provided for in section 23 of the 
Constitution, namely the right to fair labour practices which the Constitutional 
Court152 has held further encompasses the right to employment security,153 and 
secondly the right to collectively bargain with employers to improve terms and 
conditions or employment. These rights are integral in ensuring workers can exercise 
their collective power in order to attain better working conditions and employment 
security.  
 
The rights to employment security and specifically the right not to be unfairly 
dismissed are provisioned for in the LRA. Section 185 of the LRA stipulates that 
every employee has the right not to be unfairly dismissed. In terms of collective 
bargaining, section 4 and 5 of the LRA protect all workers’ rights to form and join 
trade unions, and this right is linked to the right of freedom of association. The overall 
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collective bargaining scheme under the LRA is based on voluntarism and an employer 
does not have a duty to bargain with the unions. 154  However, bargaining is 
encouraged and promoted through the provision of organisational rights which allow 
certain rights to representative unions which then allows them to have more influence 
in the workplace and increase their ability to bargain.  
 
The inadequacy of the LRA, especially section 198, has resulted primarily from the 
assumptions it was premised upon. There was a complete disjuncture between the law 
and reality. These assumptions included that, the workplace is the place of business of 
the employer, employment is a binary relationship, employment is indefinite, and 
lastly that central industry bargaining still reigns supreme and different industries are 
demarcated according to the nature of the business undertaking conducted at the 
workplace.155  
 
In many ways the provisions of section 198 of the LRA, undermined these rights and 
often left workers at the mercy of unscrupulous employers. The formulation of section 
198 of the LRA aids in this task as does the nature of the relationship between the 
broker, the worker and the client. The labour broker employs a worker, who is then 
provided to the client for a fee. The worker then works for the client, at the client’s 
premises, under the client’s supervision and is paid by the broker until the contract 
comes to an end or the client decides that the services of that worker are no longer 
necessary. Despite the worker seemingly looking like he or she is in the employ of the 
client, the LRA156 stipulates that the labour broker, and not the client, is the employer 
of that worker. This arrangement creates a number of issues. First and foremost it 
results in a disconnect between the true employer and the worker, and secondly it also 
results in a disconnect between the worker and the workplace.157 
 
This disconnect essentially results in the worker being unable to enjoy the protections 
offered under the fair labour practice jurisdiction, nor is that worker afforded his or 
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her collective bargaining rights.158 This is because fair labour practice and collective 
bargaining rights attach to the workplace. 159  Section 198 of the LRA and its 
endorsement of the fiction that the broker is the employer has resulted in a number of 
challenges and rights violations that have plagued the industry and therefore attracted 
calls for drastic measures to be taken.  
 
Some of the most common challenges faced by labour broker workers surrounded the 
legislative fiction as created by section 198. Workers who were employed by labour 
brokers were often treated differently and differentiated from employees of the client 
in that they were paid much less, could seldom bargain collectively, and in many 
instances they could be easily replaced and had very little recourse to remedies.160 In 
reality, labour broker employees were never afforded the full spectrum of their labour 
protections and enforcement of these rights was a tedious and often unsuccessful 
escapade.161 This denial of rights also included those protections contained in the 
Basic Conditions of Employment Act162, the rights to fair dismissal and labour 
practices, and finally the rights contained the Employment Equity Act.163  
 
 
The labour broker was deemed to be the employer of the workers and therefore did 
not have the right to grant trade union organisational rights at the client’s 
workplace.164 Only the true employer is entitled to grant organisational rights at its 
workplace. Further, because broker employees often from workplace to workplace on 
a regular basis, and are not always in the employ of a specific client for long periods, 
trade unions found it hard to recruit and organise these workers and as a result, this 
denied the workers their right to bargain and utilize their collective power.  
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Labour broker workers also had to deal with the uncertainty that is brought about by a 
lack of job security. This is done through a commercial contract upon which the 
relationship between the broker and the client is based. Essentially this type of 
contract gives the client the right to request the labour broker to remove the temporary 
worker from his service on short notice.165 In turn the labour broker would add a 
clause in the employment contract of the worker stating that should the client make 
such a request, the labour broker is compelled to comply, and the employment 
contract will terminate automatically.166 A clear example of the abuses perpetrated 
through automatic termination clauses was demonstrated in the case of Sindane v 
Prestige Cleaning Services.167 In this instance, Prestige Cleaning Services employed 
Mr Sindane in terms of a ‘fixed term eventuality contract’. In terms of this agreement 
the period of employment between the parties was for a definite period of 
employment terminating on the termination of the contract that existed between the 
client (to whom the cleaning services were provided) and Prestige Cleaning 
Services. 168  The Client subsequently cancelled the cleaning contract, and Mr 
Sindane’s employment contract was consequently cancelled. In response to the 
application brought for unfair dismissal, the court held that no dismissal had taken 
place as Mr Sindane’s termination was clearly linked to a particular period and the 
eventuality that arose and gave rise to the termination is contemplated as being 
applicable to fixed term contracts.169  
 
 
This state of affairs has resulted in labour broker worker’s employment being 
characterised by uncertainty. The client is entitled to terminate the commercial 
contract with the broker at short notice, which, in turn would result in the broker 
worker losing his or her job. The worker would also be without a remedy. In such 
circumstances, an unfair dismissal claim could not be lodged against the client for 
whom the worker provided services as section 198 of the LRA deems the labour 
broker to be the employer. The worker would also fail in an unfair dismissal claim 
against the broker, as they had acted as per the contract, and the broker would argue 
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that the termination was out of their control as the work that had been contracted for 
was no longer available.  
 
Summarily put, the contractual triangular relationship makes it difficult to sue the real 
employer and claim procedural and substantive unfairness when dismissed. The client 
is the one who manages the employee and gives the instructions, yet that employee 
has no recourse against an unfair dismissal by that client. The situation ultimately 
denies the employee their section 23 constitutional rights to fair labour practices as 
well as denial of that employee’s collective bargaining rights and those advantages 
that are associated with collective action. Section 213, of the LRA also added to this 
legislative quagmire by defining the workplace as the place of the business of the 
employer. This resultantly made it almost impossible to for trade unions to organise 
labour broker workers.  
 
This contractual loophole was highly controversial and posed a number of problems 
that were debated in the courts. In April and Workforce Group Holdings t/a The 
Workforce Group 170 the employee’s claim failed on the interpretation of the contract 
and the triangular relationships it created. It was held171 that, as the employee’s 
contract terminated due to an act of the client who was not the employer, no dismissal 
had taken place. Although this interpretation subsisted for a while, and almost always 
to the detriment of the employee, the courts soon stepped in to attempt to give an 
interpretation which accorded with the purpose of the LRA and which would give 
sufficient protection to vulnerable workers.172 
 
In the NAPE v INTCS Corporate Solutions173 case the courts intervened to stem the 
abuses that characterised the triangular employment contract. The facts of the case 
resembled many other scenarios typical of the labour broking relationship. As per the 
usual labour broking arrangement, two contracts characterised the employment 
relationship to which the employee was subject. The first being, the labour broker 
contract with the employee by which employment could be terminated on fair 
grounds. Then, secondly, the broker and client contract, where the client had the right 
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to request the placement to end at any given moment. When the client did in fact 
exercise this right, the labour broker had no choice but to retrench the employee. The 
employee would then proceed to refer an unfair dismissal claim. Like all cases, the 
broker argued that the client was acting lawfully under the terms of the contract when 
it wished to remove the employee from the premises. The broker thereby claimed it 
was powerless to stop the process.  
 
The court started by referring to the fact that ‘everyone’ and not just employees have 
the right to fair labour practices as guaranteed by the Constitution.174 Even though the 
person was not considered to be an employee of the client, the client has a legal duty 
to do nothing that will undermine a person’s right to fair labour practices, unless the 
limitation is justified by national legislation.175 On the courts reading of section 198 
of the LRA, nothing in the section provided that a client or broker could limit such 
right.176 Accordingly, the court held that any clause in a contract that allows the client 
to undermine the rights of a person not to be unfairly dismissed is against public 
policy.177 The court continued to ascribe a duty on labour brokers to ensure that their 
clients do not insist on carrying out behaviour that is clearly in violation of ones 
labour rights.178 The court rejected the argument that labour brokers are powerless to 
resist the demands of their clients.179 In reaching this conclusion, the court said that 
the labour broker is entitled to approach a court to compel the client not to insist on 
the removal of an employee where no fair grounds exist.180 Similarly if a court were 
to reinstate an employee into the employment of the broker, the broker may enforce 
such an order against the client.181 The court found it was necessary to send a clear 
message to labour brokers no to simply accede to the whims of their clients when 
such demands conflict with their employee’s rights to job security and those demands 
are unfair. The court also reiterated that public policy demands that notions of 
fairness, justice and reasonableness are upheld.182 
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The decision was an encouraging one, and also reminds us that our Constitution is 
there to protect the most vulnerable in our society.183 The court clearly elevated the 
rights of fair labour practices, and security of employment in order to purposefully 
interpret and resultantly protect vulnerable labour broker employees. This decision 
was welcomed and showed the courts willingness to look past the facade created by 
the contracts and bring about constitutionally guaranteed protections. However, it 
could be argued that this decision fails to take commercial realities into consideration. 
A labour broker is seldom likely to want to take its client to court over a dismissal 
dispute, or interdict its client from relying on a provision of the contract to get rid of 
an employee.184 The broker would certainly lose credibility amongst its clients, as it 
will be seen to not be reliable in catering for their needs, namely flexible employment 
relationships that come without the legal headaches that follow traditional 
employment. I would therefore argue that it is far from prudent to burden the courts 
with the interpretive responsibility of making sense of labour provisions and contracts 
that deny integral rights. Instead proper regulation would better remedy the situation 
and in the process avoid the increased legal disputes.185  
 
The peculiarities of the labour broking relationship illustrate that an employment 
relationship is not always binary. The broking relationship is characterised by two 
contracts, the one concluded between the broker and the client, and the other between 
the broker and the employee. Further, with labour broker employees, and also as a 
result of the deeming provision in section 198(2), the workplace where they conduct 
their work is not the place of business of their employer. Until the boom of non-
standard employment, the workplace was always the place that the employees of the 
employer actually worked, and the employer concerned was the person in control of 
that actual workplace.186 The LRA definition of the workplace is the place where the 
employees of the employer work. Unfortunately labour broker employment does not 
correspond with this reality or with the LRA definition.187 As illustrated above, labour 
broker employees job security has often been non-existent and their employment can 
in no way be described as indefinite. Their continued employment has always been at 
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the whims of the client, when the client terminates the agreement and no other work is 
available, they are often dismissed on the basis of operational requirements. Central 
industry bargaining is also not an option because, not only has there been a decline in 
this form of collective bargaining, but labour broker employees rarely get to join trade 








Calls for a ban on the Labour Broking Industry in South Africa 
 
It is submitted that the calls for an outright ban on the industry are indeed drastic and 
further they can be argued to be unconstitutional. Lessons in this regard can be taken 
from the Namibian Supreme Court case of Africa Personnel Services (Pty) Ltd v 
Government of the Republic of Namibia188  where it was held that an absolute 
prohibition was unjustified because of the right to free trade, the need for flexibility 
for which labour brokers cater and the importance of freedom of contract.189 Apart 
from this judgment, South African labour law can also take note of other lessons from 
Namibia, with particular emphasis on the risks involved where there is a lack of 
regulation of labour brokers. 
 
In an attempt to stem the abuses brought about by labour broking, the Namibian 
government decided to ban the labour broking industry in 2007. This ban was brought 
about through the provisions of section 128 of the Namibian Labour Act.190 As it has 
done in South Africa, the labour broking industry touched a sensitive nerve in various 
societies in Namibia.191 However, although the industry was associated with the 
exploitation of workers, there were still a few objections to the complete ban on 
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labour broking.192 These objections eventually triumphed in the Namibian Supreme 
Court.193 Africa Personnel Services in the matter argued that the ban on labour 
broking infringed their right to carry on a trade or business of their choice as protected 
by section 21(1)(j) of the Constitution of the Republic of Namibia.194  
 
In summary, the court came to the conclusion that the ban on labour hire was not 
necessary in order to achieve the purpose of ensuring fair labour practices to all 
workers. The court found that the ban on labour hire contained in section 128195 was 
so broad that it essentially banned all types of atypical employment.196 This was 
found to be disproportionate and unreasonable, especially in light of the fact that the 
International Labour Organisation197 allows for labour broking and merely requires 
proper regulation.198 Further, it was held that the function of ensuring fair labour 
practices could be achieved through proper regulation, and on this reasoning the ban 
was considered to be disproportionate and unnecessary.199 In line with this rationale, 
the limitation could therefore not be upheld and fell foul of the ambit of section 
21(2).200  
 
A number of lessons can be taken from the Namibian Supreme Court judgment 
especially with regards to the constitutionality of a ban on the industry. In terms of 
section 22 of the South African Constitution, every citizen has the right to choose 
their trade, occupation or profession freely and the law is permitted to regulate any 
trade and its state of affairs. Consequently, in terms of section 22, labour brokers and 
their employees are free to partake in any legal occupation or trade. However, this 
right must be balanced with the rights in section 23 of the Constitution. Section 23 
provides that ‘everyone’ has the right to fair labour practices. In light of this right to 
fair labour practices not being realized due to the abuse of the tripartite broking 
relationship, regulation by the law of an occupation or trade, as provisioned for by 
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section 22 would best serve the purpose of respecting and achieving both rights. Most 
importantly, this can be done without unnecessarily derogating from one right or the 
other. It is submitted that an overall ban on the labour broking industry would fail to 
meet the threshold set out in the section 36 limitations clause of the Constitution. This 
failure would be on the basis that the limitation is far-reaching in that it bans the 
whole trade whereas there are less restrictive means that exist that can ensure the 
fulfillment of both rights. The new framework needs to be able to adequately police 
the industry and protect workers, whilst still retaining the freedom of one to conduct 
any legal trade and the beneficial aspects like flexibility that labour broking provides. 
These aspects will be fully canvassed in chapter 4 when the amendments are 







































The Purpose of Labour Law 
 
 
A significant issue to consider when assessing labour laws, or in fact any laws in 
general, is what function are those laws expected to serve. “A premise or basis of any 
legal dispensation is the purpose or the function of such laws.”201 A look to the 
purpose of labour law helps us understand what results are sought when labour laws 
are promulgated and when we debate issues central to labour matters. A question also 
arises as to whether the purpose of labour law has changed over time, and whether 
this has been reflected in the changes to our own labour laws and the LRA. If 
legislation is unable to achieve its perceived function or purpose then that legislation 
has to be revised.202 Discussions surrounding the purpose of labour law have always 
been punctuated by the traditionally articulated dictum by Otto Kahn-Freund 
 
This dictum as forwarded by Otto Kahn-Freund comes across in the following 
quotation: 
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“ The relation between an employer and an isolated employee or worker is 
typically a relation between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of power. 
In its inception it is an act of submission, in its operations it is a condition of 
subordination, however much the submission and subordination may be concealed in 
that indispensible figment of the legal mind known as the ‘contract of employment.’ 
The main object of labour law has always been, and we venture to say will always be, 
to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining power which is 
inherent in the employment relationship”203 
 
This power imbalance allows the employer to dictate the rules and who must comply 
with such rules. It is said that the primary purpose of labour law has been to regulate 
this power imbalance, support employees, and restrain the power of employers and 
their management against that of organised labour. Essentially labour law has sought 
to maintain a balance of power and afford protection to the employee, who 
traditionally has been seen as the weaker entity.  
 
These sentiments are echoed in case law, most notably in the Labour Appeal court 
decision of National Entitled Worker’s Union v Commissioner for Conciliation and 
Arbitration.204  The case involved a constitutional challenge to specific provisions of 
the Labour Relations Act and the Employment Equity Act in that they did not provide 
for remedies for an employer in instances where an employee resigns without notice. 
It was argued by the employer that the employee’s actions violated the employer’s 
right to fair labour practices. In short, the case was based on the contention that the 
failure of the Labour Relations Act and the Employment Equity Act to provide a 
remedy for employer’s who suffered unfair labour practices was unconstitutional.  
 
In dispensing with the application, the judge made note of the fact that legislation is 
enacted if a need for such legislation has arisen.205  Under the common law the 
employer’s position was strong as against an employee.206 Under the common law 
regime, if an employee was dismissed lawfully, which essentially involved being 
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given proper notice of the termination of his or her contract or if the employee was 
paid notice pay in lieu of notice, the employee had no remedy in law even if the 
reason to terminate had been unfair.207 The courts could also not provide any remedy 
to the situation. Unfair labour practice jurisdiction was introduced partly to provide 
employees with greater protection as the need had clearly arisen through the unequal 
employment relationships that characterised labour law.208  
 
The court found that in general the position of employers is different from that of 
employees.209 Employers are sufficiently powerful when compared to individual 
workers210 and employees are generally extremely vulnerable to an exercise of such 
power. Employers enjoy greater social and economic power and labour legislation has 
been necessary to intervene and provide greater protection to vulnerable employees 
and regulate the power imbalance. 
 
Prior to the amendments, the provisions of the LRA dealing with labour brokers and 
their employees has given little protection to the workers in those relationships and 
has resultantly failed to give effect to the traditional purpose of labour law as set out 
by Otto Kahn-Freund. The situation has been left to the labour courts to rectify and 
give an interpretation to the legislative provisions that accorded some sort of 
protection to labour broker employees, and in doing so would align with the purpose 
of labour law.211 Adopting a purposive interpretation of the provisions, in order to 
afford the requisite protection, has provided some limited protection.212  
 
The LRA sets out a number of policy objectives that it seeks to achieve through the 
application of its provisions. These principal aims and objectives can be seen to be 
relatively ambitious.213 Among its objectives, section 1 states that the LRA seeks to 
advance economic development, social justice, labour peace and the democratisation 
of the workplace. Further, the LRA is expected to give effect to the rights contained in 
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section 23 of the Constitution, as well as fulfilling the obligations incurred by South 
Africa as a member of the International Labour Organisation.  Promotion of orderly 
collective bargaining also stands chief among these obligations. The challenges 
associated with labour broker workers has ensured that the LRA is dismally failing at 
accomplishing the majority of its objects in this regard.   
 
 
A Brief Discussion on The function of Labour Law  
 
Labour law canvasses and regulates a large and integral part of society. It thereby 
wields immense potential to affect multiple aspects of everyday life, including the 
potential to fulfil socio-economic objectives. Labour law is difficult to define and 
there is no comprehensive all-encompassing definition.214 Generally put, labour law is 
the totality of rules that regulates legal relationships between employers and 
employees, “the latter rendering services under the authority of the former,” at the 
individual as well as the collective level.215  
 
Employment is a central aspect of everyday life. It is inextricably linked to a person’s 
ability to source an income and maintain their own welfare as well as that of their 
dependents. Employment affords economic power that in turn affects an individual’s 
ability to dictate the direction and trajectory of their life.  This economic power is 
coupled with other rights and privileges associated with employment, such as 
insurance, medical aid and employee retirement schemes, amongst other things. 
Attaining full employment can be said to be one of the principle aims in a person’s 
lifetime, and resultantly allows a person, depending on the quality of the post, to 
somewhat evade the poverty and poor living conditions that generally characterise the 
lives of those who remain unemployed.   
 
Further, employment is socially esteemed, this probably being a result of its ability to 
command a certain lifestyle. Society attaches feelings of self worth to ones 
employment status, and certain jobs are revered above others. However, and most 
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importantly, unemployment and underemployment lies at the core of poverty.216 For 
the poor employment is often the only asset they can use to improve their well-being, 
hence the creation of productive employment is essential in achieving poverty 
reduction and sustainable economic and social development.217  As a consequence of 
its socio-economic importance, employment and its accompanying labour laws, has 
the ability to influence and affect a significant aspect of the populace it controls. 
Labour laws and policies have the capability to create employment, ensure 
employment security, as well as protect vital socio-economic rights, and in so doing 
greatly improve the lives of those within its sphere. The World Summit for Social 
Development has put the goal of full and productive employment at the forefront of 
the United Nations agenda and they have recognized that productive employment will 
be the most effective means of promoting social integration 218  and reducing 
poverty. 219  In turn, governments committed to promoting full employment and 
making it a priority to their economic and social policies.220  
 
Further, at the 2005 World Summit, countries committed to making the goals of full 
and productive employment as well as decent work a central objective of national 
polices. Labour broker workers are part of an increasing reliance on non-standard 
work, as opposed to that of full-time employment. Further, labour broker workers are 
often the most vulnerable and come from the poorer parts of our society. Policies that 
are tailored to protect the rights of these workers and their ability to sustain a 
livelihood are central to improving the lives of the poor. The purpose that underlies 
our labour laws and their promulgation is consequently of immeasurable significance.  
 
 
Predominant approaches to the Purpose and Function of Labour Law 
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Creighton and Stewart221 are of the view that there are two main approaches to the 
purpose and function of labour law.222 The first being the ‘protective view’ and the 
second being the ‘market view’.223 
 
The protective view focuses on the idea that there is an imbalance of power between 
the employer and the employee. The employer, being the stronger party, is able to 
dictate the majority of the terms of employment and the employee is therefore left at 
the mercy of this discretion. As a result of this imbalance, the employee has very little 
bargaining power and the function of the law is to protect the employee and assist and 
regulate this imbalance so that equity and fairness rules the arena.224 A look at South 
African labour legislation would suggest that this view dominates the thinking behind 
its approach.225 This approach, based on pluralism, is said to be the labour law system 
behind all liberal democracies.226 The pluralist approach revolves around regulating 
the inherent conflict that lies at the heart of organisations comprising of employees 
and employers who harbour conflicting interests.227  
 
Section 23 of the Constitution caters for both employers and employees rights to 
freedom of association and to bargain collectively in order to facilitate the resolution 
of these conflicts.  The resolution of the conflict is beneficial to both parties in order 
to avoid the destruction of the organisation. Both employers and employees have an 
interest in the management of the conflict and continued survival of the 
organisation.228 The pluralist system centres on balancing these two powers, and 
where this cannot be achieved it usually leads to industrial action by either party.229 A 
situation leading to collective action is always disruptive and can affect large sectors 
and resultantly follow on to damage the welfare of the county’s economy. Labour 
law, according to the protective view attempts to protect employees by creating a 
system that facilitates meaningful collective bargaining.230 
                                                
221 Creighton B and Stewart A Labour Law: An Introduction 3ed (2002) The Federation Press.  
222 Vettori (2005) University of Pretoria 24. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Vettori (2005) University of Pretoria 24. 
225 Vettori (2005) University of Pretoria 24. 




230 Vettori (2005) University of Pretoria 26. 
 49 
 
The market approach proposes that market forces are preferable to the government 
intervention in order to achieve economic growth and success.231 This approach 
results in reduced intervention from government with regard to setting minimum 
labour standards and basic conditions for employment. According to the market 
approach, state intervention in the form of protection for the employee results in an 
artificial distortion of the market forces which in turn results in economic 
inefficiencies and a loss of prosperity.232 The principal premise of the approach is that 
the operation of the market is more favourable to the attainment of the efficient 
allocation of resources.233 Labour laws are meant to refrain from interfering with 
market forces, and rather work together with them.234 The restricted intervention 
therefore leads to a stronger economy that at the same time will cater to the interests 
of both employers and employees.  
 
The basic premise of the protective approach, namely protection of the employee, 
mirrors the traditional proposition to the purpose of labour law as formulated by Otto 
Kahn-Freund. This is particularly apparent when the latter part of his dictum is 
examined. The relevant segment reads as follows;  
 
“The main object of labour law has always been, and we venture to say will 
always be, to be a countervailing force to counteract the inequality of bargaining 
power which is inherent in the employment relationship”235  
 
The principal purpose of labour law is to maintain the equilibrium between employers 
and workers by ensuring an effective operation of a voluntary collective bargaining 
system.236 Beyond that labour law is also seen as concerned with the protection of 
social rights.237 As mentioned above, South African labour legislation generally 
corresponds with this approach. The protection of workers’ rights and fair labour 
practices is comprehensively provided for in chapter eight of the LRA. South African 
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labour law is also committed to the facilitation of voluntary collection bargaining. 
This means that there is no judicially imposable duty to bargain. This is 
fundamentally linked to the right to freedom of association as guaranteed in the 
Constitution. Further, the voluntary nature is fostered through the provision of 
organisational rights, collective bargaining aides, and other mechanisms provided for 
in chapter three of the LRA. Prior to the amendments, it can be stated that the LRA 
provisions dealing with labour brokers explicitly failed to guarantee the protection of 
the workers or facilitate orderly and voluntary collective bargaining. This was as a 
result of trade unions often being unable to access labour broker employees as their 
place of occupation was constantly changing, and also because they were not 
considered to be employees of the client and therefore could not be organised under a 
trade union that was recognised by the client.  
 
 
The question remains as to whether Otto Kahn-Freund’s sentiments regarding the 
purpose of and function of labour law still hold their relevance. If his sentiments are 
still relevant, can they be paired together with other ancillary purposes in order to 
derive greater benefits from the application of labour laws, especially with regard to 
marginalised workers such as labour broker employees? Further if his sentiments are 
regarded to be out-dated, what should the new purpose entail and where should its 
priorities lie?  
 
In my opinion, Kahn-Freund’s notions on the function of labour law still hold ample 
relevance. In this regard a few parallels can be drawn to the challenges facing labour 
broking in South Africa, and the calls for enhanced regulation. As outlined above, the 
challenges facing labour broker employees illustrate the consequences of a poorly 
regulated relationship between a bearer of power and one who is not a bearer of 
power. The labour broker employee is at the heart of this submission, and 
subordinates his or herself to the broker’s terms and conditions. For the most part, the 
employee is at the mercy of the broker’s ability to secure employment. Where no 
employment is found, the employee then becomes a victim of the ‘legal figment’ that 
is the commercial contract of employment. The arrangement attempts to give the 
impression of freedom of contract, but instead allows for that employee to be 
dismissed without any recourse to the labour protections he or she is supposedly 
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guaranteed. Consequently labour law continues, and rightly so, to have and need to 
impose the obligation to protect vulnerable workers who find themselves at the wrong 
end of the power imbalance. This, however, is not to say that other functions cannot 
simultaneously coexist. 
 
Although the traditional purpose has always been to equalise the bargaining power 
between employers and their employees, it should be mentioned that this traditional 
purpose has been met with more contemporary ideas of what objectives labour law 
may be used to achieve. Labour law and its purposes should not be confined to one 
arena and it could benefit from multiplicity of commitments that can come together to 
bring about employment opportunities, job security and business flexibility whilst still 
regulating the power imbalance. These commitments could include enhancing 
workers employability, enhancing access to the labour market for new entrants, as 
well as assisting workers during transitional phases in their working lives.238 
 
Allowing for a multiplicity of commitments would allow for greater flexibility and 
also cater for situations that do not ascribe to the traditional conceptions of the 
employer and employee relationship. An example of mistaken conceptions can be 
seen in the assumption that the employee is always the weaker bargaining entity as 
this is not always the case, for example with highly skilled workers who are often able 
to dictate their own terms.239 The usefulness and flexibility of resolutions could be 
used to confront the ever changing nature of the labour arena, as is evident in the 
labour broking arena. The flexibility could also lend itself to resolving different 
challenges that may arise throughout labour law. “The attempt to identify a single 
defining goal loses sight of the differing purposes of different types of labour law.”240  
 
Labour law can be used to support policies such as social security, training and 
education, labour placement and mobility, job creation and immigration law.241 A 
regulatory approach to labour law can also achieve social policy goals by using 
mechanisms and strategies that ensure that workers in fact receive the intended 
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benefits of their labour rights.242 In relation to labour broker employees, this will 
entail that they receive their constitutional guarantees, and they do not suffer abuses 
as a result of the tripartite relationship and its ability to circumvent labour laws. 
 
A large portion of the analysis of the amendments will focus on whether or not the 
new provisions adequately cater for the protection of labour broker employees. 
However, it should be noted that the analysis will also look as to whether the 
amendments fulfil other commitments and this is especially in light of the above 




The Impact of International Labour Conventions on Debates surrounding Labour 
Broking  
 
As stated above, the LRA is expected to give effect to the rights contained in section 
23 of the Constitution, as well as fulfilling the obligations incurred by South Africa as 
a member of the International Labour Organisation. With regard to the regulation of 
labour brokers, the ILO has adopted the Private Employment Agencies Convention,243 
which seeks to balance flexibility and the protection of labour broker workers. The 
convention takes note of the importance of flexibility in the functioning of labour 
markets. However, it also emphasises the importance of protecting workers against 
abuses as well as the need to guarantee the rights to freedom of association and 
collective bargaining.244 Social dialogue is also highlighted as being necessary to 
guarantee a functional labour relations system.245  
 
As the convention recognises the important role labour brokers often play in the 
labour market, it therefore allows for the operation of labour broker agencies while at 
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the same time upholding important worker protections. In South Africa, as was stated 
in the previous chapter, the adequate protection of labour broker workers’ rights to 
freedom of association which is in turn linked to collective bargaining, has always 
been an area of deficiency. Article 11 of the Convention246 specifically provides that 
national law and practices must adequately provide for freedom of association and 
collective bargaining for these workers, as well as ensuring that they are not paid 
below the minimum wage. 
 
The International Labour Organisation’s Decent Work Agenda also stands among 
South Africa’s international obligations. Like those who advocate for labour law 
embracing a multiplicity of purposes, the ILO Decent Work Agenda also brings about 
a broader focus on how labour law is supposed to function.  
 
As its name suggests, the Decent Work Agenda is aimed at promoting decent work 
for all. As work is central to people’s well-being, it is important that such work is able 
to pave the way for broader social and economic advancement.247 In order to achieve 
these goals it is important that such work is decent. “Decent work sums up the 
aspirations of people in their working lives.”248 Interpretation of what decent work is 
should be viewed through the prism of the ILO’s four strategic objectives.249 These 
four objectives are, promoting jobs, guaranteeing rights at work, extending social 
protection as well as promoting social dialogue.250 Promoting jobs allows for job 
creation, more employment opportunities and therefore more people with the ability 
to sustain their livelihoods. Guaranteeing rights at work is integral for the recognition 
and respect for workers rights, especially disadvantaged and poor workers who need 
representation and laws that work with their interests.251 Extending social protection 
ensures workers are permitted adequate family and rest time as well as adequate 
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health care. And lastly the promotion of social dialogue is central to avoiding 
disputes, increasing worker participation and building cohesive organisations.252 
 
“Decent work embraces all forms of productive activity and is not about 
universally applicable standards, Decent work envisages all workers, not only 
employees, on the same continuum, with those at the bottom suffering the most 
‘decent work deficits’ and workers further up the continuum suffering fewer such 
deficits. The decency of work, or the lack thereof, depends on the realisation of four 
core values, namely, the opportunity to work, the right to freedom of association, 
social protection and voice.”253  
 
How we will deliver on these values for those outside standard 
employment,254 for example labour brokers, is an important question that needs to be 
addressed. Promoting decent work is seen to be key in reducing poverty and 
achieving equitable, inclusive and sustainable development.   
 
Ensuring decent work conditions and the fulfilment of social rights has been 
particularly challenging in the labour broking arena as was shown in the previous 
chapter. Labour brokers offer their clients short-term risk free employment that allows 
for business flexibility.  Short-term employment has become an integral part of 
certain businesses, especially those who deal with seasonal surges in business. The 
short-term flexibility, which often allows for instant termination at the request of the 
client, also permits businesses the elasticity to be able to curb financial 
responsibilities of paying wages when the need arises. This therefore affords them the 
ability to survive and adapt to the ever-fluctuating global markets. Labour brokers are 
therefore seen as the perfect tonic to the increasingly volatile employment market. 
They allow businesses the flexibility to keep their costs as low as possible, and also 
alleviate the responsibility of complying with applicable labour laws. Especially with 
regard to non-standard and temporary workers, it can be said that the call for 
flexibility has trumped that of ensuring job security.  
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Will an Integrated Function provide a solution to the Challenges faced? 
 
The question needs to be asked as to whether a variety of functions can be merged 
together and peacefully coexist. Simply put, and with particular regard to labour 
broker workers, would it be possible to allow for business flexibility, whilst still 
protecting worker’s employment security and ensuring the subsistence of decent 
work. In light of the argument above that labour laws can mesh together a multitude 
of functions in order to achieve more extensive goals, it is argued that the integration 
of labour flexibility and employment security could be particularly beneficial where 
adequately provided for.  
 
In this regard, it should be noted that South Africa has developed its own brand of 
integration. South African policy makers have taken account of the fact that it is not 
the sole purpose of labour law to provide protection for workers.255 South Africa has 
adopted the concept of ‘Regulated Flexibility’ that provides for the selective 
application of legislative standards, depending on the remuneration earned by workers 
and the size of the employer’s undertakings.256 Flexibility and the protection of 
workers’ fundamental rights underpin this South African approach. 257  It also 
recognises that lower earning employees are often in a more precarious position than 
those who earn higher salaries.258 Further, the policy also recognises that smaller 
undertakings should not be burdened with obligations that could potentially introduce 
rigidities and costs that would inhibit job creation.259 
 
Although South Africa has developed a multifaceted system, the question still 
remains as to whether there are other approaches that could support or supplement our 
labour policy. When considering the proposition as to how labour law can benefit 
from a multiplicity of functions, it becomes important to consider how these functions 
can work in tandem in order to produce more desirable results. Employment security 
is closely aligned to the traditional ‘protective view’ as outlined in this chapter, where 
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the employee is protected from the stronger bargaining power of the employer. On the 
other hand, business flexibility closely aligns with the ‘market view’ that advocates 
market forces as being preferable to the government intervention in order to achieve 
economic growth and success. Flexibility tends to be a metaphor for unfettered 
markets.260 Yet, it is said that there is no such thing as a completely unregulated 
market, as with labour markets, because they function effectively only because they 
are surrounded by a set of institutions that generate common rules, and most 
importantly reflect the interests of the participants.261 In the present instance that 
would entail allowing for business needs, but also acknowledging worker’s rights to 
security.  
 
The concepts are therefore at odds which each other, and seem to present a sort of 
oxymoron.262 People are generally always suspicious when two elements of social and 
economic policy are presented as complementary, where they are almost always 
commonly seen to be linked in a trade–off manner.263 For many, increasing flexibility 
in the labour market is synonymous with decreasing job and employment security, 
because a relaxation just means a relaxation of the laws regulating the hiring and 
firing of workers.264 This relaxation generally comes in the form of offering more 
flexible forms of employment, such as fixed term jobs, labour broker agency jobs and 
other forms of atypical jobs that produce less security.265 The development of the 
many atypical forms of employment and the previously discussed labour broker 
triangular employment relationship points to proof of a trade-off between flexibility 
and security.266 This has consequently resulted in two labour market policies that have 
been constantly pitted against each other, and this has often led to a stalemate in 
policy reform. 267  COSATU have understandably led the calls for employment 
security, while employers have argued the benefits of flexibility.268  
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The concept of ‘Flexicurity’ proposes a third labour market view that could overcome 
the fundamentally opposed policies as described above.269 Within this conception, 
flexibility and security are not opposed, but instead are complementary of each other. 
Flexibility and security therefore come together and transform into a complementary 
process through social dialogue.270 Flexibility and security amalgamate and become 
mutually supportive in facing the challenge of globalisation.271  
 
The elements of flexibility, within the concept of flexicurity entail: external and 
internal numerical flexibility, functional flexibility, wage flexibility.272 The security 
dimension involves: job security, employment security/employability security, 
income security and combination security.273 There is a shift within the security 
element, the shift being from traditional stable employment security and relationships 
in private firms and the public sector, towards security by employment policies and 
new social rights that protect individuals between jobs.274  Flexicurity involves a 
number of policy objectives. It involves instituting active labour market policies that 
help people to cope with rapid change, unemployment spells, reintegration and 
transitions to new jobs.275 Reliable and responsive lifelong learning involves a system 
that ensures continuous adaptability and employability for all workers.276 Modern 
social security systems provide adequate income support and facilitate labour market 
mobility.277 Modern social security also includes provisions that help people combine 
work with private and family responsibilities such as childcare. Lastly, supportive and 
productive social dialogue, as mutual trust and developed industrial relations is 
integral to ensuring that flexicurity policies are properly introduced.278  
 
The demanding nature of the policies means that extensive financial government 
support is necessary especially when supporting workers who are out of the 
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employment cycle as well as provisioning for additional social rights. Essentially, the 
employment security element in flexicurity derives from the government providing 
for extensive employment benefits and social security. In welfare states, such as 
Denmark, this is normally achieved through progressive taxation. Flexicurity 
essentially demands the relaxation of job protection in exchange for adequate social 
and unemployment benefits and active labour market policies. It results in workers 
being protected but their jobs not being afforded the same.  
 
Although, this welfare state model may not be perfectly suited to the South African 
landscape, there are useful elements that can be gleaned from it in order to facilitate 
greater security and protection for labour broker workers. Further, it is highly unlikely 
that unions would allow for decreased job protection, especially when taking into 
account the levels of unemployment in South Africa, and the already stringent nature 
of the dismissal provisions in the LRA. However, lessons regarding the greater 
provision of social rights and employment protections could be taken on board as a 
way to aid not only labour broker workers who are between employment, but also all 
forms of non-standard workers. Additionally, facilitation of training and schemes to 
keep the worker’s skills relevant could also assist in allowing labour broker workers 
to find employment.  
“Temporary employment is on the rise and all indications are that, in the 
future, workers will migrate between temporary short-term employment. The only 
way in which stable access to social benefits will be assured is if the benefits are not 
channelled through the employer, but through a different platform that does not 
assume regularity of income that has been associated with waged employment.”279  
 
Where the government is not able to do so, trade unions should consider being the 
conduit for providing these social rights when workers are bereft of employment. This 
would involve trade unions taking on workers who are not necessarily employed at 
the time, but are between employment. This will be the case in order to accommodate 
and facilitate their needs in between jobs.280 
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Discussions surrounding flexibility and security relate to the provision and application 
of the decent work agenda in that the agenda constitutes a framework for social policy 
that incorporates both flexibility and security amongst other elements.281 Although 
each country has its own social goals, there are broad goals that are mutual and these 
include the importance of access to productive employment for all, security of work 
and income, respect for core rights in the work place; including dignity of work, 
freedom of association, the role of work in social integration and personal 
development, as well as the democratic process of social dialogue by which these 
goals are set and achieved.282 These are all elements of the decent work agenda.283 
Achieving decent work therefore calls for a concerted effort where policies promote 
employment promotion and protection, as well as security, income support, but also 
competitive and productive systems in which adaptability and innovation are key.284  
 
South Africa can gain direction from both the Decent Work Agenda and flexicurity 
policy approaches adopted by the ILO and the EU.285 Both policies seek to balance 
flexibility with the protection of workers, as well as aspects like training, social 
security measures and the promotion of dialogue.286 The purpose of labour law needs 
to look beyond the “mere fortification of employee’s rights.”287 The purpose of labour 
law should also incorporate aspects that may discourage or encourage job creation 
and which also integrate skills development and social security protection into a 
refined encompassing labour market.288 Some encouragement can be taken from the 
fact that expenditure on social grants has increased in South, which is received by 
some 13 million individuals.289 The expenditure on welfare and social grants has 
increased from R30.1 billion in 2000 to 101.4 billion in 2009.290 This could certainly 
be argued to be a positive sign with regard to providing for those out of employment. 
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Labour brokers and other non-standard forms of work are there to provide flexibility. 
However flexibility and economic success is not the only part of the picture. Efforts to 
achieve decent work as well as flexible employment relationships are part of a bigger 
picture and should be considered when formulating functions and policies.291 The 
bigger picture should involve creating a better and more stable society for all which 
accommodates the interests of all members in the society, and where decent work 


























                                                



















The relentless abuses perpetrated in the non-standard arena led to the introduction of 
the much-needed amendments that form the principal subject matter of this paper. The 
statutory ring fencing of labour broker arrangements contributed to an externalised 
labour market and the dehumanisation of contract workers to mere units of labour.292 
From an early stage it was clear to see that South African labour legislation was not 
nearly adequate enough to provide protection for employees in non-standard work 
relationships.293  Section 11 of the Private Employment Agencies Convention of 1997 
places an obligation on member states of the ILO to take steps to implement policies 
that protect employees involved with labour broker agencies.294 The amendments seek 
to address specific problem areas associated with the abuse of labour broker 
workers.295 
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The bulk of this analysis will focus on the provisions of the amendments that may be 
seen to be contentious. While the analysis canvasses the specific sections that have 
been brought about, comment will also be made as to whether these sections make 
provision for protective as well as flexibility measures.  It is clear from the first 
reading and further from the reasoning behind the promulgation of the amendments, 
that their function is squarely set towards providing adequate protection and ensuring 
security and the realisation of fair labour practices for labour broker workers who fall 
below the BCEA threshold. However it is also apparent that the legislature has also 
sought to provide for genuine instances of temporary work, and in doing so has 
allowed some flexibility in this regard. After the discussion has touched on the subject 
matter referred to above, the analysis will look to discuss the various amendments, 
while at the same time pointing out the protective aspects of those sections, as well as 
those parts of the sections that allow for flexibility. A protective approach does have 
its merits especially on the back of the abuses witnessed in the labour broker arena, 
however, this paper will attempt to illustrate the advantages of a twofold approach 
where the LRA focuses on protection and flexibility in order to facilitate a better 
balanced approach. The case of Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration296 will also be looked as to inform the 
conversation on the section 198A(3)(b) deeming provision and the way forward as 
regards its correct interpretation. 
 
 
A Critical  Overview of Section 198A of the LRA 
 
The modified section 198A sets out to regulate labour broker arrangements and stem 
the commodification of these workers while at the same time making the labour 
broker client more accountable in specific circumstances.297 Section 198(1) of the 
LRA defines a temporary employment service298 as any person who for reward 
procures or provides to a client other persons who perform work for the client and 
who are remunerated by the TES. Notably, section 198(2) of the LRA still stipulates 
that in genuine instances of temporary work, the TES remains the employer of the 
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worker. The bulk of the amendments are thus to be found in section 198A of the 
LRA. Section 198A defines a ‘temporary service’ as work for a client by an employee 
for a period not exceeding three months; or as a substitute for an employee of the 
client who is temporarily absent; or in a category of work and for any period of time 
which has been determined to be a temporary service by a collective agreement 
concluded in a bargaining council, sectoral determination or a notice published by the 
Minister. Workers falling under the categories set out in section 198A(1) remain 
employees of the TES in terms of section 198(2). Although it should be noted that, as 
per section 198A(2), section 198A only applies to workers earning under the 
prescribed threshold in terms of section 6(3) of the BCEA. The earnings threshold as 
per the BCEA currently sits at R205,433.00 per annum.  
 
In my mind the threshold postures various problems. The threshold might be seen to 
be arbitrary, as it could be argued that workers who fall outside the threshold are also 
seen to be vulnerable. The threshold can therefore be seen as a tenuous proxy. The 
threshold essentially assumes that vulnerability is linked to income, and those who 
fall outside it are not vulnerable. Further, the threshold can be used to deny workers 
the protection of section 198A. This can be achieved by ensuring that these workers 
remain outside the threshold. This is accomplished by ensuring that their wages 
safeguard that their earnings remain in excess of the threshold. When taking action 
against such abusive practices, it will be particularly difficult to prove that the 
employer is doing this purposefully to avoid the application of the protective 
provisions. Although one can see the reasons behind the application of a threshold, it 
is submitted that other workers above the threshold could also find themselves in 
precarious relationships as these relationships would still be governed by section 
198(2) and they would consequently encounter the same problems as before the 
changes.  
 
Much has been made of the protections provided for those workers falling below the 
threshold. However, some thought also needs to be given to those who fall above it 
and are still subject to the same legislative regime that led to calls for the 
amendments. Those falling just above the threshold might still be as vulnerable as 
those below it; however, they will have the misfortune of being on the wrong side of 
the threshold. Those workers who are above the threshold will still face the same 
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problems with regard to losing their jobs at the whims of the client and the 
commercial contract and not being able to take any action against such client or 
exercise their collective bargaining rights. Conversely, it could be suggested that 
courts that are faced with vulnerable workers who fall above the threshold will still be 
able to afford these workers adequate protection by ignoring the threshold and 
providing a purposive interpretation of the legislation and its goal to introduce 
protective measures for vulnerable labour broker workers.  
 
The threshold does however illustrate that the legislature considered issues 
surrounding security as well as flexibility. This comes across in attempting to ensure 
that those businesses employing those who are above the threshold are not overly 
burdened by the application of the amendments, as their workers are presumably 
stronger bargaining position as opposed to those vulnerable workers below the 
earnings threshold. Further considerations of flexibility are similarly demonstrated 
through section 198A(1)(c) of the LRA and its allowances for circumstances where a 
categories of work and for any period of time can be determined to be a temporary 
service by a collective agreement concluded in a bargaining council, sectoral 
determination or a notice published by the Minister. This thereby allows for further 
genuine usages of temporary workers that do not fall squarely within the grounds of 
the first few requirements of section 198A(1)(a) and (b).  
 
Workers falling below the threshold and whose work is not categorised as temporary 
are given the benefit of the deeming provision in section 198A(3)(b). The deeming 
provision under section 198A(3)(b) states that the client is deemed to be the employer 
of the worker, but only in instances where the worker is not seen to be performing 
temporary work in terms of section 198A(1). It goes further to note that such 




The amendments in 198(4A) continue the protective theme that characterises the 
majority of the changes. Section 198(4A) follows on from section 198(4) in that it 
provides for joint and several liability for the client and the labour broker. Section 
198(4A) goes on to provide that if the client of the TES is jointly and severally liable 
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in terms of section 198(4), or is deemed to be the employer in terms of s 198A(3)(b) 
then the employee may institute proceedings against either the TES or the client, or 
both the client and the TES. The joint and several liability as set out in section 
198A(3) is for the purposes of the LRA and extends to unfair dismissals and unfair 
labour practice disputes.299 As per section 198(4A)(c), any award made against the 
TES or the client in terms of section 198(4A) may be enforced be enforced against 
either party. Conforming with the protective drive is section 198(4B) that stipulates 
that a TES must provide an employee whose service is procured for the client with 
written particulars of employment that comply with section 29 of the BCEA, when 
such employee commences employment. Section 198(4C) provides that a TES may 
not employ a worker on any terms of conditions that are prohibited by any 
employment laws, sectoral determinations or collective agreements. The courts are 
also entrusted to maintain this protective scheme by ensuring in terms of section 
198(4E) that they scrutinise every provision in the employment contracts between the 
TES and the client in order to determine whether the provision complies with section 
198(4C). These protective measures in section 198(4)(A) are linked and reinforced by 
section 198A(4) and 198A(5). Section 198A(4) prohibits any terminations of the 
employees service at the instance of the TES or the client in order to avoid the 
application of section 198A(3)(b). Terminations in such instances will be regarded as 
dismissals.  The section also comes to the aid of the often mistreated and under-
paid300 labour broker workers by ensuring that where the client is deemed to be the 
employer in terms of section 198A(3)(b), then that client must treat the employee on 
the whole not less favourably than an employee of the client performing the same or 
similar work, unless there is a justifiable reason for different treatment. On the whole 
not less favourable has been interpreted to mean that terms and conditions other than 
the fundamental terms of employment should not differ.301 Principally, it requires that 
the fundamental terms offered to the employees are essentially the same.  
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Section 198(4F) provides another significant protective provision. It provides that 
Labour Broking agencies, or TES’s, are required to be registered in terms of any 
applicable legislation or regulations. The fact that the TES is not registered will not 
constitute a defence to any claim instituted in terms of section 198A.  The 
Employment Services Act302 (ESA) creates a framework for regulating labour broker 
agencies.303 In terms of this ESA, it will be a criminal act to operate without 
registration.304 These restrictions have been instituted in a bid to stem the tide of 
abuses perpetrated by the infamous ‘bakkie brigade.’305  
 
As noted in the preceding chapters the vulnerability of labour broker workers has also 
been amplified by the inability of such employees to effectively gain access to 
organisational rights.306 This has come about as a result of the tripartite working 
relationship, with the employees’ workplace often being different to their place of 
work.307 Changes to sections 21 and 22 of the LRA attempt to remedy this situation 
by providing that a trade union may exercise organisational rights in respect of TES 
employees, either at the workplace of the TES or one or more clients of the TES. 
These changes have been brought about in an attempt to encourage trade unions to 
actively recruit and organise employees of labour brokers in such a manner that their 
needs and interests are adequately represented.308 
 
Section 21(8)(b) of the LRA has been added and allows for a commissioner, when 
tasked with resolving a dispute over whether a trade union is representative within a 
particular workplace, to consider the composition of the workplace whilst taking into 
account the extent to which there are employees of labour broker agencies and other 
non-standard employees. This provision serves to promote trade unions’ participation 
by making it easier to organise and show representativeness in a workplace. The 
organisation of labour broker employees is also promoted, as they are now considered 
as part of the workforce.309  
                                                
302 4 0f 2014 (From hereon the ESA) 
303 Cohen (2014) ILJ 2616; Employment Services Act 4 of 2014 section 13.  
304 Ibid.  
305 Ibid.  
306 Cohen (2014) ILJ 2619; Botes (2015) SALJ 116.  
307 Theron (2012) Acta Juridica 60-3. 
308 Cohen (2014) ILJ 2616.  
309 Botes (2015) SALJ 116.  
 67 
 
Section 21 seeks to remedy the problems surrounding the labour broker employees’ 
workplace being different to where they actually work. This relief comes in the form 
of section 21(12) of the LRA. The section circumvents this obstacle by permitting 
trade unions to exercise organisational rights in respect of employees of a TES, at the 
workplace of either the TES or one or more clients of the TES. The section goes 
further and states that where the trade union exercises such rights in the workplace of 
the client of the TES, any reference in chapter 3 of the LRA to the employer’s 
premises must be read as including the client’s premises. This approach is justified 
especially when one looks at the control the client exercises over the employees at 
that client’s work premises.310 More importantly, these provisions are of immense 
importance for the collective bargaining rights of the labour broker employees. In 
theory, it can be said that the amendments might resolve the more serious problems of 
collective bargaining in the triangular employment relationship.311 It can also be said 
that this provision will do a lot to decrease trade unions’ antagonism towards labour 
broker employees and encourage them to make greater efforts to recruit them.312 The 
right to collective bargaining has been noted by the ILO and the Constitutional Court 
as being fundamental to the rights of human beings at work.313 
 
The task of remedying the provision of this fundamental right is supplemented by 
sections 22(5)(a) and (b) of the LRA. These sections deal with the applicability of 
arbitration awards that are made binding on the employer. However, and more 
importantly, the sections provide for such awards, to be made binding additionally to 
the extent that it applies to the employees of the TES, or a client of the TES for whom 
an employee covered by the award is assigned to work. Further, the award will also be 
binding on any person other than the employer who controls access to the workplace 
to which the award applies, if that person has had the opportunity to participate in the 
arbitration proceedings. The provision allows a system where all the parties concerns 
are considered and upheld against the necessary and relevant parties.314 
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The realisation of collective rights are integral not only to labour broker employees 
but to all workers being able to exercise their collective power, and consequently 
bargain for better conditions, and alleviate some of the problems associated with their 
employment. Trade unions can now easily include labour broker employees in their 
bargaining process through the enhanced procedures for the procurement of 
organisational rights.315 As was suggested in the previous chapters of this paper, 
suggestions have been made that the government, in drafting the amendments, failed 
to consider measures related to the collective bargaining arena that could remedy the 
prevalent issues in the non-standard and labour broking arena.316 Although it could be 
argued that more attention could have been paid to these suggestions, namely, by 
providing more means to strengthen the collective power of non-standard workers. 
Although it can be said that trade unions are at present in a steady decline, it must be 
stressed that they could be doing more to organise non-standard and temporary 
workers and attempt to stem the tide of their decline by increasing membership.317 
The law is not always in a position to remedy each and every glitch that may arise in 
the labour arena. At times it may require further efforts from the trade unions and 
their members to ensure fulfilment of their rights. This could also allow a platform for 
the government to make more of an effort to increase social rights and guarantee 
benefits that could protect and galvanise these workers. Further it is also submitted 
that on the face of it, the amendments seem to go far enough in remedying the 
appropriate collective bargaining complications. Whether this is in fact the case can 




The Interpretation of the section 198A(3)(b) Deeming Provision 
 
Despite the bulk of the amendments being lauded for the necessary changes they have 
brought about, there is still some discomfort surrounding some of the sections and in 
particular section 198A(3)(b) of the LRA. As noted above, this section provides that 
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when an employee is deemed to not be performing temporary services, then the client 
is deemed to be the employer of that employee. The employee is therefore deemed to 
be an indefinite employee of the client, subject however to the provisions of section 
198B. Section 198B(3) allows for workers to be employed on fixed term contracts for 
longer than six months in specific instances which will therefore not attract the 
consequences of the section 198A(3)(b) deeming provision. The controversy 
surrounding the section develops when one considers the different interpretations that 
could be accorded through its application.  
 
Despite the recent decision in Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v Commission for 
Conciliation Mediation and Arbitration,318 there still exists a flurry of legal debate 
concerning the correct interpretation of the section. Interested parties are anxious for 
the courts to unravel the provision and the true meaning that was intended by the 
legislature.319 However, it must be noted that these parties harbour a preferred 
position that would ultimately serve their best interests.  
 
The main purpose of the deeming provision goes to the heart of the abuses perpetrated 
on labour broker employees. It seeks to limit the use of these employees where the 
work cannot be seen to be temporary. Thus the section ties in with the protective 
purpose of the amendments and consequently imparts hefty penalties by deeming the 
client to be the employer of the worker for the purposes of the LRA. The extent of the 
obligations brought about by section 198A(3)(b) make the interested parties all the 
more anxious to attain certainty on its application.  
 
Ultimately, the term ‘deemed’ has caused the majority of the controversy, and the 
debate has surrounded the fact as to whether or not it means that the broker is no 
longer considered to be the employer.320 The broker party can be said to be in support 
of the position that the deeming provision results in dual-employment, and that the 
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broker still remains the co-employer.321 Conversely, the trade unions have supported 
the view that the client becomes the sole employer,322 and thereby takes on all the 
obligations that come with being ascribed as the employer of an employee on 
indefinite employment. When one considers the highly protective provisions of the 
LRA, the consequences of sole employment would have far-reaching consequences 
that either party would seek to avoid.323  
 
It would seem almost obvious that in instances of uncertainty provisions and their 
effects should be interpreted in line with their intended purpose.324 This purpose, as 
has been noted above, is to protect broker employees from being exploited and 
employed for long periods, on inferior terms, in instances that do not constitute 
temporary employment. Simply put, the provisions are put in place to prevent the 
abuses characterised by employment by labour brokers.  
 
Some suggest that a purposive approach would result in the provision being 
interpreted to allow for the dual employment approach as advocated by the broker 
party.325 This approach results in the client, together with the broker being the 
employers, with the client being the employer only for the purpose of the provisions 
of the LRA.326 It is further suggested, as per the rules of legal interpretation, that 
provisions should generally be interpreted by giving meaning to the plain and 
ordinary language used.327 In line with this rule, one would look to ascertain the 
meaning of the term that has been the point of all the controversy. The term ‘deem’ in 
the Oxford Dictionary is said to mean “to regard or to consider.”328 Therefore, it is 
argued in some sectors, that if the word is ascribed its plain and ordinary meaning, it 
could be strongly argued that the legislature intended the dual employment 
approach.329 This would allow for the employee to exercise the protective rights 
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conferred by the LRA against the client, without terminating the employment contract 
between that employee and the labour broker.  
 
In keeping with the legislature being clear and unambiguous in their choice of words, 
it is further argued in an article by Deidre Venter, that had the legislature intended to 
provide for sole employment, it would have been far clearer in doing so.330 It can be 
argued that the legislature should have had no problem expressly providing that in 
such instances as those that fall under section 198A(3)(b), the contract of employment 
will wholly transfer to the client, and the client will thereby solely employ such 
employee. Other sections surrounding the deeming provisions also lend their voice in 
support of a dual approach. Section 198A(3)(a) stipulates that the labour broker is 
contemplated as being the employer in instances of genuine temporary employment. 
This might illustrate that the protection of two employers is only intended to arise in 
the instance of vulnerable lower paid workers.331 It may also be illustrative of the fact 
that where the legislature desires one party to be seen as the employer, it is often 
express and unambiguous in its intention. Section 198(4A) can also be said to support 
the dual employment stance, in that it affords the employee the right to institute 
proceedings or enforce compliance with the BCEA against the broker, the client, or 
both.332 This provision is inserted since the deeming provision operates only for the 
purposes of the LRA, consequently the BCEA would therefore have not be 
enforceable against the client in its capacity as the deemed employer.333  This again 
points towards a legislative approach where the client is deemed to be an employer 
for the purposes of the LRA and for the purpose of the employee being able to 
exercise its LRA protections against the client. 
 
However a further alternative and insightful view is offered by Paul Benjamin.334 
Benjamin sees section 198A of the LRA as performing an important function, namely 
that of providing additional protections for lower paid temporary service workers.335 
In Benjamin’s opinion section 198A(3)(b) of the LRA is clearly brought about to 
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replace section 198(2) of the LRA that deems the TES to be the employer.336 Because 
section 198A(3)(b) is put in place to operate where section 198(2) does not, it is 
therefore reasoned that there exists no situation where the two sections operate at the 
same time and dual employment is envisioned.337 Benjamin therefore submits that the 
correct approach is to have only one of the sections operating. Either the TES is the 
employer and that would come about in terms of section 198(2) of the LRA where the 
employee is seen to be performing genuine temporary work, or conversely, the client 
is deemed to be the sole employer in terms of the section 198A(3)(b) deeming 
provision. The question of dual employment is therefore not even supposed to be a 
relevant consideration.338  
 
Benjamin therefore advocates for the sole employment approach. In his opinion, the 
amendments, and the section 198A(3)(b) deeming provisions main function was to act 
as a deterrent to clients using labour broker workers on a long term basis, as when 
coupled with section 198A(5) the sections provide that such client must treat the 
deemed worker no less favourably that the client’s other employees performing the 
same or similar work.339 It therefore becomes more expensive for the client to pay 
workers the same as other employees and, in addition, pay the labour broker its fee for 
providing the worker.340  
 
However, despite some support for the sole employment approach, the Labour Court 
in Assign Services (Pty) Ltd v CCMA341 concluded in favour of the dual approach 
system. The conclusion came about as the court dealt with the issue as to whether the 
broker was concurrently vested with statutory rights and obligations as well as the 
powers and duties that are given to the employer in terms of the LRA.342 Summarily 
put, did the deeming provision advocate dual employment? As briefly noted above, 
the broker party argued in support of the workers remaining employees of the broker 
as well as being deemed to be the employees of the client for the purposes of the 
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LRA. Therefore, the contract of employment between the broker and the employee 
would not fall away, and neither would the rights and duties created by such contract. 
In opposition, the trade union advocated the sole employment by the client for the 
purpose of the LRA. Because of the Constitutional right to freedom of trade, on this 
basis Benjamin notes that the legislature could not ban labour broking, however, the 
next best solution came about by promulgating section 198A(3)(b) in order to 
strongly disencentivize labour broking and enforce the strict sanction of sole 
employment.343 
 
In coming to its conclusion, the court noted that it saw no reason why the broker 
should be relieved of its statutory rights and obligations towards the employee on the 
basis that the client has acquired a parallel set of rights and obligations.344 The worker 
does not therefore sacrifice the rights gained on the basis of its employment 
relationship with the broker because of the fact that such worker has been placed with 
the client,345 or alternatively on the basis that the client has been deemed to be the 
employer by section 198A(3)(b). A lot of the focus in the proceedings was placed on 
the meaning of the term ‘deemed.’346 In the circumstances, the court leaned towards a 
construction of the word that fell in line with the general architecture and purpose of 
the new provisions. 347 This architecture constructs better protection for the worker 
and further supports an upgrade of the joint and several liabilities between the broker 
and the client that resultantly support the dual-employment approach.   
 
 
Nonetheless, this finding is not without controversy, and has done very little to stem 
the tide of arguments for and against the opposing views. The most influential of 
these opposing views being Paul Benjamin, who was predictably critical of the 
judgment and its findings.348 The judgment did however rightly point out that the 
provision is still set to give rise to considerable litigation in the future.349 A lot of the 
issues may arise when considering the practical application of the provision. One 
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must consider the remedies that might be available to an employee who claims unfair 
dismissal against the client, especially where that employee is immediately placed 
with another client following the dismissal. In instances where an unfair dismissal is 
referred, what remedies is that employee entitled to?350 The employee would still be 
employed by the broker, although it would now be at a different client. 351 
Reinstatement would be difficult, as the employee would have already been placed 
with a new client. If reinstatement were to be ordered, would this reinstatement 
resurrect the triangular relationship between the broker, the client and the 
employee?352 Further, compensation would also be problematic, as that employee 
would not have lost any income due to the immediate re-placement with another 
client.353 In such instances, it is submitted that the remedies could maybe come in the 
form of punitive payment to the employee for the client’s failure to follow and uphold 
that employee’s fair labour practice rights. Issues also surround what would happen to 
temporary workers where a client is the employee for the purposes of the deeming 
provision in the context of a sale of business as a going concern.354 In such instances, 
as the client is an employer for the purpose of LRA rights and obligations, and 
because transfers of businesses are also under the ambit of the LRA, would the 
contract with the broker transfer to the new employer, and therefore entitle that broker 
to receive a fee for those deemed employees?355 
 
A lot of the hypotheticals illustrate the issues that could surround the interpretation of 
the section 198A(3)(b) deeming provision. It is therefore submitted that the each case 
will resultantly have to be dealt with on a cases by case basis and only time will tell 
where the path of the provision will end. However, it could be argued that Paul 
Benjamin’s sole employment approach averts the majority of these hypothetical 
issues and difficulties.  In light of the differing views it seems highly unlikely that the 
recent Labour Court’s ruling will bring an end to the debate.356 This is also as a result 
of the fact that the court did not have a proper factual issue set before it. Instead it had 
to consider a point of legal construction; speculation therefore became inevitable, as 
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were the hypothetical scenarios that arose because of the abstract manner of the case 
framed before the court.357 It is therefore submitted that the necessary inclusion of a 
proper factual dispute will aid the courts in envisioning what type of protection the 







A Brief Comment on the Possible Socio-economic Impact of the Increased 
Protections in Section 198A of the LRA  
 
Although the amendments have been lauded in the majority of labour circles, there 
are still pockets of dissent that not only disagree with the increased protection brought 
about by these changes, but also with the general ‘over-protective’ stance adopted by 
the LRA. Even before the amendments were brought into operation, and at the very 
early stages of their development, the business sector was up in arms with claims that 
the changes would increase the cost of employment and resultantly lead to large-scale 
losses of jobs.358 In their infancy, the proposed amendments were criticised as they 
were predicted to hinder job creation and the growth of the economy by restricting 
flexible employment arrangements.359 Since they have come into effect, it can be said 
that similar criticisms are still being levelled at the changes.  
 
Labour laws are intended to protect workers from unfair labour practices perpetrated 
by employers, as well as to counter and protect the worker from the imperfections in 
the global and national financial markets.360 However, by imposing strict labour 
restrictions, and increasing protections, labour flexibility is somewhat weakened and 
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businesses are not afforded unrestricted adaptability. Research therefore draws a 
strong correlation between stringent employment protection and a reduction of job 
creation.361 Studies suggest that strict labour protection hinders the effectiveness of 
labour market flows, as well as harming productivity and growth.362 
 
One of the purposes of the LRA is to provide the means for the Constitutional rights 
in section 23 of the Constitution to be realized and upheld. However, the LRA also 
has other objectives, and chief among them, is to advance economic development.363 
With this in mind, and taking into consideration the effect that increased protection 
may have, it is also important to consider the effects the amendments may have on 
South Africa’s economic objectives. Key to economic development is the injection of 
foreign investment.364 The amendments impose further restrictions on South Africa’s 
supposedly already rigid employment arena, and it is argued by some that this will be 
a further deterrent to vital foreign investment. 365 
 
In this regard, the World Bank’s 2013 Global Competitiveness report, which 
measures various competitive aspects of economies, is brought forward to sustain the 
argument that the amendments will act as a further deterrent to investors. In terms of 
this report, South Africa is ranked at the bottom of the scale in various categories.366 
Countries are given a rating on a scale from 1-144. In terms of Labour market 
efficiency, which includes; cooperation in labour-employer relations, flexibility of 
wage determination, hiring and firing practices and redundancy costs, South Africa 
was given a rating of 113 out of 144.367 It has been argued that these poor ratings are 
as a result of South Africa’s stringent labour laws and with the enactment of the 
amendments the situation could be exacerbated. 368  
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As the working world has changed over the years, increased labour market flexibility 
has become an important part of businesses being able to stay viable within the global 
market. Skills shortages, the increase in global competition and the improvement of 
technologies has resulted in a situation where flexible employment arrangements are 
often the economically favoured means of employment.369 In an effort to remain 
competitive, there has been a trend in business to outsource their non-core functions 
and to bring in specific skill sets for certain projects when and if they are needed.370 
These employment relationships are often temporary and for fixed periods, or when 
the relevant project is completed. As noted throughout this paper, temporary and non-
standard, and its accompanying business flexibility, has therefore become an integral 
part of the global economy. 
 
Resultantly, it is argued by some that the amendments provide increased impediments 
to the provision of this necessary flexibility. Through increased regulation, it is said 
that the amendments make the non-standard arena an unattractive option. 371 
Consequently, two large multinational companies have apparently taken their 
business out of South Africa, in their reasoning; they attribute the country’s over 
protective labour laws that make it difficult for businesses to operate.372 From this 
comes the correlation between strict employment laws and the creation of barriers to 
employment. The heavy burden hanging over large businesses in the form of South 
Africa’s rigid labour laws means that large businesses are reluctant to hire more staff 
and expand.373 
 
It should however be noted, and in contrast to the data above, that in terms of data 
compiled by the OECD in 2013, countries were ranked on a scale of 0-6 as to the 
strictness of their dismissal laws. In terms of this scale and in relation to individual 
dismissal, South Africa was ranked at 1.4 as compared to the OECD average, which is 
marked at 2.29.374 These numbers would suggest that South Africa and its labour laws 
are not overly constricting. In spite of this, it is submitted that there is a need for a 
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comprehensive package that includes both the protection of workers as well as 
business flexibility and adaptability.375 But more importantly, it should be noted that 
this flexibility should not become the vessel for which abuses are perpetrated and it 
should never come at the cost of providing constitutionally recognized worker 
protections.  
 
Although it can be shown that stringent laws may have an adverse effect on job 
creation and the provision of flexibility, caution still needs to be undertaken when 
tackling this issue. While it may be true that strict labour laws form some sort of 
deterrent and allow for less flexibility, it is submitted that decent work and the 
protection of workers should be at the forefront of the LRA’s function. Only once 
workers can be guaranteed fair and dignified employment, should methods that may 
alleviate the effects of over-protective labour laws be looked to. This is especially true 
for the labour broking arena where the abuse towards vulnerable lower paid workers 
has subsisted for an intolerable period. In the present, and because of the abusive 
system that the LRA and labour broking has recently come from, it is important first, 
to deal with allowing for decent work for all workers. It would be irrational to 
provision for flexibility while the vulnerable are still taken advantage of.  
 
The history of the labour market, as set out in the previous chapters also needs to be a 
source of consideration. This is with particular regard to the long history of vulnerable 
and unrepresented workers being denied specific protections and representation. This 
should be considered in tandem with non-standard workers inability to access the 
collective bargaining arena. These workers can therefore be seen to be in desperate 
need of the LRA’s protection. South Africa will not easily move from a situation 
where trade unions considered the abuses to be so excessive that they called for a ban 
for all labour broking, to the LRA relaxing protections in order to cater for business 
interests. It is submitted that, in the current labour climate, and with the parties 
surrounding the market still at odds over various issues, the provision of decent work 
and labour rights should remain at the forefront of our thinking.  
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In light of what has been discussed above, and throughout this paper, it has been well 
established that the purpose and function of the amendments has been to provide non-
standard workers with the patently lacking protection that they require. In this regard, 
it is submitted that on the face of it, it would seem that the amendments have gone far 
enough to achieve this function. However it should be noted that only time will tell, 
and the application of the provisions by our courts will better serve as a barometer as 
to the proficiency of the changes.  
 
Although the provision of protection has been the main thrust of the changes, the 
legislature has not forgotten about the important role that non-standard work plays in 
providing for business flexibility. In order to allow and maintain the economic 
flexibility provided by labour brokers, the amendments do not ask that genuine 
temporary workers should be remunerated on the same scale as the client’s permanent 
workers.376 By providing temporary employees with comparable wages after only 
three months, as per section 198A(5), it allows for client’s to be more cost effective 
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and allows the broking industry to retain the advantages they offer to businesses.377 
Although there is no minimum wage, it has been suggested that there should be a 
provision that perhaps ensures that a suitable living wage is maintained, this might be 
achieved by way of a sectoral determination.378  
 
Conversely, it could be argued that such a provision has become unnecessary. This 
comes in light of the amendments to sections 21 and 22 of the LRA that will 
supposedly make collective bargaining more accessible to non-standard workers. In 
line with this thinking, it could therefore be left to the trade unions and their use of 
bargaining through collective mechanisms to ensure that their members are 
adequately remunerated. This would be in line with South African labour law’s 
emphasis on centralised voluntary bargaining. 379  Further, it is submitted that 
legislation and its provisions should not always be looked at to provide answers for 
every single eventuality. It is impossible for the provisions of the LRA to provide for 
each and every nuance or peculiarity that may arise in the labour market. The 
provisions should instead be able to be flexible enough and contain flexible measures, 
mechanisms and platforms to be able to resolve unforeseen consequences. Thus, 
reliance should be placed on these mechanisms that have been brought about to cater 
for these sort of eventualities. These issues are well suited to be resolved through the 
use of the LRA’s collective bargaining mechanisms. These submissions further fall in 
line with Rochelle Le Roux’s sentiments that trade unions need to re-invent 
themselves and do more to protect their members, regardless of what type of 
employment those members might fall under.380 
 
The amendments are definitely a welcome change. This is especially so for the 
vulnerable workers who fall under its ambit. Questions, however, do still need to be 
asked as to what abuses will and might still be eventuated on those who fall just 
outside the threshold. This is still an area of concern, and it would seem that they 
would still find themselves in the same precarious position as the one prior to the 
amendments.  
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On a more positive note, the amendments are to be lauded on a number of aspects that 
they introduce. First and foremost, they bring about the necessary protections needed 
for vulnerable labour broker workers.381 This coming in the form of the alterations to 
how trade unions access these workers, and also the protections places in section 
198A of the LRA. Secondly, the amendments also bring about general change and 
protection for all types of non-standard workers.382 Thirdly, since employment is the 
primary mechanism through which benefits and growth is secured, as well the means 
by which decent and dignified work is attained.383 Lastly, although it may be to a 
lesser extent, the amendments do make allowances for flexibility and for non-standard 
work to retain the benefits it gives to the business arena 
 
In response to the criticisms that the amendments provide an impediment to creation 
of jobs and economic growth, it can be submitted that one of the major functions of 
these amendments was to ensure decent work and the securing of basic rights. This is 
not to say that this is the only purpose that should be sought after. It is entirely 
possibly to provision and balance out both the protective and the market view. The 
protective view would obviously entail the protection of workers, which the 
amendments clearly achieve. While the market view would focus on allowing for 
business flexibility, another issue that the amendments tackle head on it can be 
submitted, adequately provide. The balance of the two opposing approaches is 
therefore crucial as they both have considerable merits that aid the labour market in 
general.  
 
In light of the difficult task of providing for impermeable security, while still 
considering issues of flexibility, the legislature should be commended for managing 
this difficult balancing act. Although there are genuine criticisms that can be levelled 
at the alterations, it can be said that for the most part, the amendments are consistent 
with international conventions regulating agency work, such as the ILO’s Private 
Employment Agencies Convention384 as well as the European Union’s Temporary 
Work Directive.385 Both of these instruments, like the amendments, seek to regulate 
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the temporary employment industry whilst still retaining its scope for labour market 
flexibility.386 In the ILO’s directive’s preamble, recognition is made of the fact that 
the labour broker industry provides necessary flexibility, while at the same time 
making note of the need to prohibit and prevent the abuse of these types of temporary 
employment arrangements.387  
 
Employers in South Africa have for a long time relied on the nuances of the non-
standard arena in order to circumvent statutory obligations and justify differential 
treatment of these workers.388 As a result, these vulnerable workers have had to 
endure inferior work conditions that lack the security that is central to fair labour 
practices and decent work.389 Consequently the amendments were urgently needed to 
remedy this untenable state of affairs. It is because of this, that the introduction of 
protective measures is commended. It can be indisputably submitted that the context 
definitely warranted such an approach. This is not to say that this approach will 
always be the mandatory and necessary function.  Just as was illustrated in the 
preceding chapters, context often, and rightly so, dictates what is required in the 
specific circumstances. For these reasons, it is submitted that the amendments, and 
their protection based slant, have not only come at an appropriate time, but have also 
done well considering the difficulty surrounding the situation, and the pressure to 
cater for the dual function of worker protection, as well as that of business flexibility. 
Consequently, once the abuses have receded, the time will come for further advances 
in providing flexibility and for this function to take the forefront and lead the LRA 
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